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Abstract 
Beck, and other researchers have postulated that anxious 
individuals have cognitions that overemphasize negative information, 
thereby maintaining and/ or increasing anxious mood. Self-perceptions of 
cognitive abilities were examined in fifty-one primary school children in 
Standards 3 and 4. On the basis of scores on the Social Phobia and Anxiety 
Inventory (SPAI), 55% of the participants were classified as socially 
anxious and 45% were classified as non-socially anxious. After completing 
two cognitive performance tasks, a mathematics test and an impromptu 
speech, participants self-perceptions of them.selves and their cognitive 
abilities were evaluated. The results showed that cognitive distortions in 
cognitive information-processing as described by Beck and previously 
addressed in relation to depression, were also observed in socially anxious 
children. In addition, socially anxious children were more likely than 
non-socially anxious children to have negative expectations for their 
social performance and com.pare them.selves unfavourably with others. 
The results supported the overly negative self-evaluations of socially 
anxious children, while the self-evaluations of the non-socially anxious 
children were more positive. Socially anxious children also made more 
negative self-statements and negative attributions to explain the outcome 
of negative events. The findings of the present study are discussed in 
reference to previous theories and research. Suggestions are also offered 
for future research directions. 
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Introduction 
Anxiety is a common emotion affecting people of both genders, all 
ages, and all walks of life. Being interviewed for a much-wanted job, 
giving a speech or performance before an audience, competing in a 
sporting play-off, dating someone for the first time, or simply walking into 
a roomful of strangers can make almost anyone feel anxious. Everyone at 
one time or another experiences some form of anxiety. No one is 
immune to anxiety, but not everyone is debilitated by its effects. The 
difference between those who use anxiety as an asset and those who regard 
their anxiety to be a liability exists in the way people perceive feelings of 
anxiety and their ability, or inability to cope with it. 
Since the mid-1980's considerable research has been conducted 
examining the various cognitive components of social anxiety. Social 
anxiety is characterised by feelings of self-consciousness, apprehension and 
emotional discomfort when anticipating or engaged in social-evaluative 
situations. The socially anxious person believes he or she is under the 
scrutiny of others and consequently, has a fear of negative evaluation by 
others. As a result, the socially anxious person fears that he or she will be 
found to be foolish or inadequate in some way. A high likelihood of 
negative expectations regarding their ability to interact with others 
contributes to heighten physiological arousal when in social situations. 
Consequently, a number of cognitive theories of social anxiety have 
been postulated, and the cognitive model that is the forerunner of the 
investigation is that proposed by Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985). Beck 
et al.'s cognitive information-processing theory of anxiety is considered to 
be one of the most complete accounts of cognitive processing in emotional 
disorders (Wells, 1992). In addition, Beck et al.'s theory focuses on the 
cognitive component of anxiety which appears to be the primary factor of, 
and unique to the social anxiety construct. Several authors have suggested 
that cognitive factors play a particularly important role in social anxiety 
(Arkin, Appelman, & Burger, 1980; Johnson, Johnson, & Petzel, 1992; 
Smith, Ingram & Brehm, 1983). The common ingredient of social anxiety 
is an excess of self-centred cognitive and perceptual operations. In 
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addition to the behavioural and physiological components of social 
anxiety, the cognitive component of social anxiety involves personal 
beliefs, assumptions, and expectations about how the environment works 
and one's role in the environment. Everyone thinks about their 
capabilities in relation to different situations and may have doubts about 
whether they will succeed. The socially anxious person seems to become 
overly preoccupied with these self-evaluative thoughts and can become 
self-defeating if the individual does not possess the means to handle the 
situation. This anxious self-awareness can have detrimental effects by 
arousing emotions that interfere with the perception and appraisal of 
events, and of the reactions of others. 
No other studies to date have specifically investigated the 
relationship between social anxiety, biased information-processing, and 
cognitions in children. Of particular interest to the present study is the 
relationship between social anxiety and biased information-processing. 
Moreover, the relationship between distorted information-processing and 
self-defeating cognitions is also of concern to the current study. From this, 
several assumptions from Beck's theory can be drawn and inferences 
concerning the self-perceptions of socially anxious children can be made. 
The introduction is presented in 4 sections. Section 1 briefly 
explores the concept of social anxiety and its related constructs such as 
distinctions from other anxiety disorders, prevalence, age of onset, and 
gender differences. Section 2 looks briefly at the development of Beck's 
cognitive theory of depression and more extensively, his theory of anxiety. 
The main purpose here is to outline the cognitive information-processing 
theory as it is related to social anxiety, and to review a number of relevant 
studies. Flaws and weaknesses of the theory are also reviewed. Section 3 
examines developmental factors in childhood and their relevance for 
social anxiety. This section also details a number of studies conducted in 
this area. Finally, section 4 outlines the design features and predictions of 
the present study. 
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1. Social Anxiety: What is it? 
Anxiety and fear are significant biological characteristics that help to 
ensure the survival of the human being. Such emotions are believed to 
be reactions to real or perceived threatening situations or objects. As a 
result, they organise our psychobiological reserves to defend, escape, or 
avoid the approaching danger or threat to oneself. 
The concept of social anxiety has been identified in the literature to 
include a varied cluster of characteristics. These attributes may be reflected 
in terms of severity with social phobia representing the more clinical and 
acute end of the continuum, versus shyness and communication 
apprehension which may not qualify as a distinct clinical disorder. In 
addition, these characteristics may also be represented as different 
categories with several subtypes (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). 
Social anxiety has habitually been categorised as an adult disorder 
and the prevalence of this condition is predominantly based on research 
with adults. Beidel, Turner, and Dancu, (1985) estimated that 
approximately 20-41 % of the population experience some degree of 
performance anxiety or distress when interacting in social situations or 
performing in public. This is consistent with Zimbardo (1977) who also 
estimated 40% of North Americans experience intense discomfort in social 
situations causing them to avoid these social situations and other similar 
encounters whenever possible. Although social anxiety can develop at 
any age, empirical evidence has documented a range from as young as age 
8, (Beidel & Turner, 1988) up to 20 years of age (Amies, Gelder, & Shaw 
1983; Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer, & Klein, 1985; Marks, 1970). At times, the 
severity of this discomfort forces many of these individuals to avoid social 
interactions. Furthermore, the inability to adapt to these social 
surroundings may be reflected in lack of career advancement, inability to 
develop meaningful relationships, or inferior academic performance. 
Social anxiety involves a critical awareness of the self as an object of 
examination to others. Certain social situations share the common 
ingredient of potential social disapproval as each individual's 
performance can be readily observed and evaluated by others. Generally, 
these situations are not a problem for most individuals, and some may 
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even go as far as to say that the associated arousal experienced in these 
conditions is beneficial to their performance. For the socially anxious 
individual, however, the anxiety experienced is overwhelming and can 
become a significant source of discomfort and distress. The difference 
between the reactions of non-socially anxious individuals and the 
reactions of socially anxious individuals in social situations involves 
concerns with how they are being perceived and evaluated by other 
people. Put another way, social anxiety appears to occur when people are 
concerned about the impressions others are forming of them (Schlenker & 
Leary, 1982). Because others' perceptions and evaluations have important 
implications for people's actions and outcomes in life, real or imagined 
evaluation by others can elicit social anxiety. 
Social anxiety is truly a social phenomenon. By definition, social 
anxiety is linked with the presence of other people. The focus of the social 
anxiety reaction is based on face-to-face or interpersonal encounters and it 
should be noted that feelings of social anxiety often are experienced with 
anticipating or imagining social interactions (Leary, 1986). Social anxiety is 
unique in that it not only is a central feature of many abnormal 
psychological conditions, it also infiltrates the ordinary experiences of 
human behaviour (e.g., avoid talking in public, eating in public, using 
public conveniences). Thus, at the very heart of social anxiety is the 
primary fear of negative evaluation or scrutiny of the social self by others, 
(DSM-III-R: American Psychological Association, 1987) regardless if this is 
actually true or not. Fear of negative evaluation is a powerful stabilizing 
force in a hierarchical social organisation (Trower, Gilbert, & Sherling, 
1990). The literature on conformity demonstrates that almost everybody 
will go to extraordinary lengths to obey social rules (e.g., Milgram 1965). 
Many employ these rules and conventions as standards by which they 
evaluate and generate their own social behaviour. These social rules, and 
in particular status-defining rules, have an extreme influence on the 
behaviour of the socially anxious individual. This evaluation encourages 
feelings of apprehension, self-consciousness, and general emotional 
distress. By and large, individuals with social anxiety fear that scrutiny 
will prove embarrassing, humiliating, and shameful, causing them to 
look foolish in some way. The person fears that he or she will be found to 
be defective or incompetent by others and therefore will be rejected. 
Consequently, the individual is perceived to have an irrational fear of, 
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and a compelling desire to avoid such situations. It must be emphasised 
that social anxiety is not always irrational, nor maladaptive. It is assumed 
by others that the beliefs socially anxious individuals have about 
themselves and others are irrational. These beliefs, however, are not 
perceived by socially anxious individuals as irrational, but are regarded as 
being rational, reflecting reality, and valid interpretations of reason. 
Thus, it is in this context that one can understand the development 
of the social self by means of presenting oneself in a favourable light or, by 
means of self-presentation (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Schlenker and Leary 
(1982) suggest that anxiety occurs when individuals want to make a 
favourable impression but doubt that they will do so. According to 
socially anxious individuals, the purpose of self-presentation is to avoid 
negative self-evaluation and the loss of status and self-esteem it creates. 
Although social anxiety is primarily an adult disorder, it seems 
possible that children may also experience extreme forms of evaluation-
anxiety and inhibition in social situations. This is because children, like 
adults, are also exposed to the evaluation and scrutiny of significant others 
such as parents, relatives, teachers, and peers. There is no doubt that some 
children experience symptoms of shyness and some may even experience 
speech, performance, or test anxiety. Depending on their cognitive 
capabilities, children can also make inferences regarding how one may 
appear in others' eyes, make social comparisons, and thus draw 
conclusions as to their self-concept. As a consequence, this study attempts 
to trace the associated symptoms and effects of social anxiety in childhood. 
A number of researchers (Schlenker, & Leary, 1982; Watson & 
Friend, 1969; Zimbardo, 1977) have postulated that social anxiety is 
represented by intense physiological arousal when in social situations, 
extreme self-consciousness, a fear of negative evaluation or scrutiny by 
others, negative evaluations or expectations regarding their performance 
and their ability to interact with others, and in some instances, avoidance 
of the social situation itself. In its extreme form, social anxiety is a 
behaviour disorder known as social phobia. DSM-III-R (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987) defines social phobia as an anxiety disorder 
in which the principal ingredient is a "persistent fear of one or more 
situations in which the person is exposed to possible scrutiny by others 
and fears that he or she may do something or act in a way that will be 
humiliating or embarrassing" (p. 351-353). Extreme overconcern with 
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negative evaluation causes the socially anxious individual to become self-
focused with how he or she may appear to others. Understandably this is 
likely to impair performance with the result that such fears become self-
fulfilling, a vicious circle being the likely result. It appears that the 
clinically severe form of social anxiety, social phobia is more pervasive 
and significant than is generally recognized. Available epidemiological 
data suggests that this disorder has approximately 2% prevalence in the 
general population (Robins, Helxer, Weissman, Orvaschel, Gruenberg, 
Burke, & Regier, 1984). Determining an accurate estimate of the 
prevalence of social phobia and phobias in general in children is difficult 
due to the various methodological assessments used. A New Zealand 
study (Anderson, Williams, McGee, & Silva, 1987), which investigated the 
prevalence of DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) disorders 
in a sample of preadolescents, identified social phobia in 0.9% of the 
sample. DSM-III-R lists the age of onset as late childhood to early 
adolescence, a characteristically earlier age of onset than for other anxiety 
disorders. 
Social anxiety is a primary disorder in itself, but in many instances it 
is assigned as a secondary disorder. Still in other cases, it is unclear as to 
what the primary condition is if the coexisting condition is panic disorder, 
or panic disorder with agoraphobia (Turner & Beidel, 1989). Social anxiety 
can be found among all of the anxiety disorders and may also coexist with 
other clinical conditions such as major depression, schizophrenia and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (McGlashan, 1984; Liebowitz, Gorman, 
Fyer, & Klein, 1985). Social anxiety is unique in that this condition as 
opposed to other phobic conditions, appears to affect both men and 
women in almost equal proportions (Amies, Gelder, & Shaw, 1983; Marks, 
1970). The somatic complaints experienced by individuals with social 
anxiety are also unique to the disorder. Research shows that compared 
with agoraphobic individuals, symptoms such as blushing, sweating, 
trembling, muscle twitching and palpitations were more prevailing in 
socially phobic persons (Amies, Gelder, & Shaw, 1983; Gorman & Gorman, 
1987). In addition, the cognitions of social anxiety are unique from other 
anxious conditions in that the central thoughts of socially anxious 
individuals are based on the fear of negative evalution by others. The 
socially anxious person's immediate thoughts focus on whether others 
will notice these symptoms and as a result, think of them in a negative 
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manner. Also, the desire to avoid or escape the situation is like no other 
anxiety disorder such that, the socially anxious persons does so for fear of 
doing something embarrassing or shameful. Turner and Beidel (1989) 
found from their own study (Turner, McCann, Beidel, & Mezzich, 1986) 
that socially phobic individuals tended to be much more disturbed than 
individuals with simple phobia on several dimensions. They also 
propose that the clinical state of social anxiety is much more debilitating 
than simple phobia and incorporates more general emotional distress. 
Turner, Beidel, Dancu, and Keys (1986) also attempted to clarify the 
differences between avoidant disorder and clinical social anxiety. Results 
from the study revealed that severe social anxiety is a chronic and 
prevalent disorder affecting many areas of an individual's life causing 
significant emotional distress. These condition may show associated 
symptoms of anxiety and avoidance of social situations but should not be 
confused with social anxiety. 
2. Current Theories of Social Anxiety 
Currently in the psychological literature, there are many competing 
theories to explain the aetiology and maintenance of socially anxious 
conditions. Many authors have conceptualized social anxiety as a 
subjectively unpleasant emotional reaction to perceived stress or threat in 
social situations. For example, Freud (1936) suggested that the source of 
threat was a conflict between energy systems of the brain. The exact nature 
of the threat or danger has attracted little agreement between the theories. 
In the relevant literature, there have been three major models to 
explain the development of social anxiety. The first approach adopted by 
the behavioural literature, is the conditioned anxiety hypothesis or the 
response inhibition model (Hartman, 1983). The fundamental 
assumption of this model is that social anxiety is a consequence of 
inhibition of interpersonal responses by anxiety (Hartman, 1983). This 
model hypothesizes that the individual does possess the adequate skills to 
cope with the situation but the socially anxious person's autonomic 
arousal becomes conditioned to respond in these situations and interferes 
with the individuals ability to function. Basically, social anxiety is 
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postulated to be a classically conditioned response, developing from 
repeated exposure to aversive experiences in social situations (Wolpe, 
1969). Further, Wolpe (1969) contends that assertion and anxiety are 
mutually incompatible responses and that assertion training inhibits 
social anxiety. This model is supported by indirect evidence from studies 
which demonstrated the alleviation of social anxiety and the 
enhancement of interpersonal skills through relaxation and systematic 
desensitization based therapy (Curran & Gilbert, 1975; Marshall, Keltner, & 
Marshall, 1981; Trower, Yardley, Bryant, & Shaw, 1978). 
Halford and Foddy (1982) suggest that the classical conditioning 
model is flawed in that it fails to demonstrate why individuals may have a 
sequence of aversive experiences in social situations. Furthermore, the 
inadequacy of this model to explain social anxiety is reflected in the failed 
attempts of anxiety management procedures (e.g., systematic 
desensitization) to affect individuals with severe social anxiety (Marzillier, 
Lambert, & Kellett, 1976). 
The second model of social anxiety is based on a skills deficit 
hypothesis that asserts social anxiety is a consequence of inadequate or 
inappropriate social skills within the individual's behavioural repertoire. 
This model assumes that the individual has never learned, or has 
forgotten the appropriate ways of behaving in and reacting to some or all 
social situations. This skill insufficiency may well be a result of faulty 
socialization processes (Scholing & Emmelkamp, 1989). As a result, these 
situations are associated with unpleasant consequences which produce 
subjective feelings of anxiety and distress and may lead to avoidance. 
Therapy intervention in this case usually consists of methods to 
teach socially anxious individuals skilful ways of responding to problem 
situations such as modelling, behaviour rehearsal, and selective 
reinforcement. Within this conceptual framework, it is believed that once 
a person has obtained these new and appropriate responses within their 
behavioural repertoire, their use will be maintained by reinforcement 
from the social environment (Curran, 1979). Several studies have 
observed differences (as rated by external judges) in social competence 
between high and low socially q.nxious participants (Arkowitz, 
Lichtenstein, McGovern, & Hines, 1975; Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985). 
Social skills training has been shown to enhance interpersonal 
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competence as well as reduce social anxiety (Curran & Gilbert, 1975; 
Twentyman & McFall, 1975). 
The skills deficit model is incomplete in that an appropriate social 
skills repertoire may be necessary, but not sufficient to overcome difficult 
social encounters. For example, available evidence from a study of 
heterosexual dating anxiety (Curran, Wallander, & Fischetti, 1977, cited in 
Halford & Foddy, 1982) found that all socially unskilled participants were 
highly anxious in heterosexual interactions however, not all participants 
who were highly skilled were low in anxiety. 
Finally, the cognitive hypothesis which suggests cognitive factors 
are intrinsic in the development, maintenance, and treatment of social 
anxiety has attracted universal attention. Recently, cognitive factors have 
become a popular explanation for why socially anxious individuals who 
have the appropriate social skills in their behavioural repertoire, fail to 
use skilled responses in social situations. Socially anxious individuals can 
respond skilfully in social interactions but because of inappropriate 
evaluations of their own or others' behaviour, they are usually 
unsuccessful. Cognitions such as negative self-evaluation, irrational 
beliefs, negative self-statements and so on, are believed to be responsible 
for the problems experienced by socially anxious individuals in social 
situations. 
Although there is no single cognitive theory of social anxiety, the 
literature consists of a variety of approaches of which Beck, Emery, and 
Greenberg's (1985) has been amongst the most influential. It has been 
suggested that Beck's cognitive approach is based on the most complete 
accounts of cognitive processing in emotional disorders today (Wells, 
1992). As a consequence, others have been influenced by Beck's theory of 
anxiety and the shift towards a more cognitive perspective has produced 
an array of experimental 'activity aimed at investigating the cognitive 
factors of social anxiety. 
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The Cognitive Theory of Aaron T. Beck 
Cognitive theory is offered as an alternative to traditional 
psychoanalytic and behavioural models of emotional disorders. Rather 
than viewing social anxiety as related to unconscious processes or 
conditioning, a cognitive perspective has emerged, placing emphasis upon 
maladaptive schemata, biased information-processing, selective attention, 
negative self-evaluations, faulty attributions, distorted thinking, and a 
negative internal dialogue of thought. One of the most influential 
theoretical accounts of anxiety disorders from a cognitive perspective, is 
the cognitive schemata theory of Aaron T. Beck (1976, 1985). Beck's theory 
is predominantly based on the clinical observations of depressed patients, 
owing very little to experimental research. Beck, Emery, and Greenberg 
(1985) have elaborated a cognitive model of phobias and anxiety disorders. 
The theory has since been the subject of considerable research and debate. 
A number of studies have lent support for the cognitive theory of anxiety, 
either in whole or in part. Moreover, a number of researchers have 
criticized the theory, pointing out weaknesses and flaws in both the theory 
and methodology used to test it. This section of the introduction will 
outline the basic principles of Beck's theory and review a number of 
relevant studies carried out in this area. Furthermore, several major 
weaknesses and areas of criticism of the cognitive model of anxiety will be 
considered. 
Early Development of Beck's Cognitive Theory 
Beck and colleagues developed a cognitive theory of depression and 
other disorders (Beck, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979) which was 
primarily based on clinical data. Beck, who was trained in psychoanalytic 
methods, became increasingly interested in the content of his patients' 
cognitions. As a direct result of his clinical approach, Beck's cognitive 
therapy is one of the most complete accounts of cognitive processing in 
emotional disorders today (Wells, 1992). Although cognitive therapy was 
originally developed as a treatment approach for depression it has been 
modified and subsequently applied to social anxiety in addition to a 










Automatic -----> Depression 
Thoughts 
FIGURE 1. FLOWCHART ILLUSTRATION OF BECK'S COGNITIVE THEORY OF 
DEPRESSION 
Source: Powers, M. J. (1987) Cognitive theories of depression. In H. J. Eysenck & I. Martin 
(Eds.) Theoretical Foundations of Behavior Therapy (p. 243). New York: Plenum. 
Figure 1 displays the pathway to depression in accordance with 
Beck's cognitive theory. According to Beck, the depressed individual has a 
characteristic cognitive triad of beliefs and assumptions in which the self is 
viewed as negative, the world is seen to be a terrible place, and the future 
hopeless, consisting of nothing but failure. The presence of 
"depressogenic schemata" (Williams, 1987) represents the way in which 
the individual organises his or her past experiences and how he or she 
classifies incoming information. The foundation for this negative set of 
underlying assumptions about the self, the world, and the future is 
considered to result from difficulties in early relationships. In time, these 
give rise to an enduring psychological vulnerability where upon the 
depressed individual is hypersensitive to loss and deprivation cues. 
Subsequent occurrences of similar events or related situations may give 
rise to an increase in the negative processing of events and to depression. 
As a result, Beck's cognitive theory assumes that each psychological 
disorder has a unique cognitive profile. The content of the faulty 
information processing system distinguishes each emotional state. For 
example, in depression one observes the theme of loss or deprivation. 
Beck believes that the content of cognitive functioning in anxious 
individuals is distinct from the content in depressed individuals in that 
with anxiety, one witnesses the theme of perceived psychological or 
physical danger or threat to oneself. Specifically to social anxiety, this 
potential threat is overestimated in social situations. 
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Beck's Cognitive Theory of Anxiety 
Basic Assumptions 
The basic proposition that is the backbone of all cognitive theories is 
that an individual's interpretation of situations and events mediates 
emotional and behavioural reactions. An individual's appraisal of the 
situation can serve to maintain psychopathological reactions. For the 
socially anxious this appraisal is primarily concerned with the status of the 
self in a hierarchically organised social group. A person's reactions to a 
'threat' or 'danger' situation depends on his or her appraisal of the 
harmful components of the situation as well as his or her coping 
resources. An individual's cognitive processes can be viewed as either 
assets or vulnerability factors that interact with characteristics of the 
environment to produce adaptation or maladaptation (Sarason, 1986). In 
social anxiety, precipitating events may give rise to, or exaggerate 
underlying personal preoccupations, such as fear of negative 
consequences, rejection, criticism, or negative evaluation, thus evoking 
uncertainty about outcomes, hypervigilance, and concern over potential 
self-threatening danger. The socially anxious person is continuously 
scanning the situation for social cues which may indicate hostile 
appraisals of his or her self-presentation behaviour. As a result, the 
individual might not pay adequate attention to the behaviour at hand. 
Thus the socially anxious person questions their personal capabilities to 
perform or behave in a socially acceptable way giving rise to a 
preoccupation of self-defeating thoughts. High levels of anxious self-
preoccupation interfere with the perception and appraisal of events and 
lead to distortions in estimating the possibility of social evaluation and 
acceptance. The presence of these cognitive factors are regarded as 
necessary but not sufficient in the production of affective states (Beck & 
Clark, 1988). Consequently, Beck's theory insists on the presence of 
cognitive processes in precipitating and maintaining specific emotional 
disorders. 
Both normal anxiety and clinical anxiety are associated with 
thoughts concerning imminent danger. Beck has entitled these thoughts 
that are characteristic of emotional disorders as 'Automatic Thoughts' 
(Beck, 1967). The logic behind such a label is due to the fact that these 
automatic thoughts occur rapidly, are often in shorthand form, are 
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plausible at the time of occurrence and the individual has restricted 
control over them. The critical distorted thoughts of the anxious 
individual focus on the anticipation of danger, threat, and harm. With 
respect to social anxiety, this danger may well be psychological rather than 
physical in nature, involving themes concerning anticipated humiliation, 
rejection, criticism, failure, disapproval, or embarrassment in social 
interactions. This involves an overestimation of the probability of social 
failure or negative evaluation and what might possibly occur, and an 
underestimation of his or her personal ability to cope with the situation. 
Thus an exaggeration of normal survival mechanisms in social situations 
is represented by clinical states of social anxiety. 
Beck presents an information processing model of the theory of 
anxiety by taking advantage of the structure proposed by Ingram and 
Kendall (1986). Essentially, there are two parts to Beck's theory. Firstly, 
there is the cognitive structure of the theory that refers to the stored 
experience and structures containing information in the form of 
assumptions, rules and beliefs about the self and life situations. These 
cognitive structures are called schemata. And secondly, there is a set of 
information-processing strategies that are assumed to lead to distortions or 
logical errors in thinking. 
(i) Cognitive Structures 
Bartlett (1932) introduced the first systematic schemata theory that 
defined a schemata as a combined body of knowledge stored in long-term 
memory, capable of manipulating memory processes. A concept that is 
fundamental to Beck, Emery, and Greenberg's (1985) model of anxiety, in 
addition to their work on depression (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979), is 
the cognitive schemata. In its broadest sense, the schemata have been 
referred to as a collection of beliefs, rules, and assumptions about the self 
in past, present, and future life situations. More specifically, Beck describes 
these structures as somewhat stable and relatively enduring 
representations of prior knowledge and experience (Beck, 1967). These 
cognitive structures are used in the screening, encoding, and evaluation of 
both environmental and internal information (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & 
Emery, 1979). Fundamentally, schemata represent the frame of reference 
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for the person's view of the self, others, and environment, as well as the 
past, present, and future (Vasey, 1993). 
Beck believes each psychological disorder has a characteristic 
cognitive profile, and the content of the schemata are thought to be 
specific to each emotional state (Beck & Clark, 1988). Hence, in anxiety we 
witness the theme of perceived danger or threat to oneself, be it physical or 
psychological, and of one's perceived inability to cope. For social anxiety, 
Kendall and Ronan (1990) also agree that the schemata are organised 
around a theme of threat to oneself including external threats (e.g., 
criticism, rejection, humiliation) and internal threats (e.g., negative self-
evaluation) in social situations. 
The schemata of the socially anxious person is believed to be 
focused upon external threat possibilities such as others' criticism and 
negative evaluation of the individual in social encounters. Activation of 
the schemata occurs when external stimuli indicate potential threat or 
danger and subsequently directs the focus of attention towards the 
threatening aspect of the situation (Beck, Emery, and Greenberg, 1985). For 
the socially anxious individual, when cues signal the possibility of 
evaluation in a social context, heightened vigilance for threats such as 
laughter, humiliation, or criticism occurs. For example, O'Banion and 
Arkowitz (1977) found that high socially anxious participants had better 
recognition memory for evaluative adjectives. This is consistent with 
research on anxiety in adulthood which has repeatedly demonstrated that 
anxious individuals evidence an attentional bias towards threat-related 
information (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990). Non-anxious 
individuals however, tend to guide their attention away from 
information that is threat-related. 
The self-schema is believed to be in operation at all times and 
guides the focus of attention during normal functioning. The self-schema 
of the socially anxious individual contains a high proportion of anxious 
propositions related to negative evaluation in social situations, which 
may be articulated in the form of questions. Several studies demonstrate 
that anxiety is associated with internal self-evaluative focus of attention 
(Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979; Wegner & Guiliano, 1980). 
As a result of these underlying cognitive structures, only moderate 
attention is given to environmental information, giving rise to 
distortions and biases in information processing (Wells, 1992). To be more 
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precise, Beck contends that the anxious person is hypersensitive to any 
stimuli that might indicate impending harm or threat to oneself. This 
hypersensitivity is characterised by a style of cognitive processing known 
as the vulnerability mode. The vulnerability mode is an organisation of 
schemata that "orient the individual to a situation and help him (sic) to 
select relevant details from the environment and to recall relevant data" 
(Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985, p. 54). In turn, this facilitates the 
processing of threat-related cues in social situations as the socially anxious 
person becomes fixed towards and much more attentive to threat-
congruent information. 
For the socially anxious, stimuli that are consistent with social 
threat schemata in social situations are elaborated and encoded while 
information that is inconsistent with existing schemata is neglected. 
Thus, in social anxiety states, danger or threat schemata related to negative 
evaluation dominate the information processing system. These schemata 
represent a cognitive content that consists of assumptions and beliefs 
regarding social, and psychological threats to the self, and a personal sense 
of vulnerability. The schemata are considered to be more rigid, inflexible 
and concrete than the schemata of normal individuals (Beck, 1967). This 
vulnerability mode facilitates the processing of danger or threat-related 
cues. With respect to socially anxious individuals, the vulnerability mode 
becomes active in social situations. The schemata of the socially anxious 
classify them as inadequate or deficient in the appropriate resources and 
abilities to meet social demands. Consequently, social situations are 
recognised by the socially anxious person as confrontations and challenges 
which may have the effect of disclosing unwanted signs of vulnerability or 
weakness. As a result of consistent overestimations of their vulnerability 
and shortcomings by socially anxious individuals, confirmation of their 
expectation of negative evaluation may actually prove to come about. 
When the schemata of the socially anxious individuals are 
activated, attention is directed towards threat-consistent information 
which effectively reduces the processing of schemata-incongruent 
information, making reality testing difficult. It is important to note that in 
certain situations the socially anxious individual sees what he or she 
expects to see rather than what is actually present. 
Several studies provide direct evidence of the social information 
processing procedures used by socially anxious college students. Socially 
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anxious and non-socially anxious men were asked by Goldfried, Padawer, 
& Robins, (1984) to sort social situations into categories. Socially anxious 
men sorted social situations on the basis of 'chance of being evaluated' 
compared with non-socially anxious men who categorized situations on 
the dimensions of 'academic relevance' and 'intimacy.' Robins (1987) 
conducted a follow-up study where upon socially anxious participants 
rated these social situations as more uncomfortable and risky and sorted 
these situations according to intimacy more than the non-socially anxious 
participants. The discrepancy between the two studies is suggested by 
Robins to have occurred as a result of the different stimulus materials 
used in the studies. Robins suggests that the degree of intimacy in 
different social situations is important for the socially anxious person to 
determine the behaviour he or she is to perform, or is expected to 
perform. 
Smith, Ingram, and Brehm (1983) used a depth of processing 
paradigm to examine directly the information-processing strategies of 
socially anxious individuals. Lists of adjectives were rated by socially 
anxious and non-socially anxious participants according to whether or not 
another person would use the adjective to describe them. The socially 
anxious participants recalled significantly more adjectives than non-
socially anxious participants, but this occurred only when awaiting a 
heterosocial encounter. Smith, Ingram, and Brehm (1983) postulated that 
the advanced recall evidenced by socially anxious individuals is an 
indication of increased processing of social threat cues. They believe this 
occurred because how one appears to others was schemata-congruent for 
socially anxious participants anticipating social interactions. Results also 
revealed that the recall of socially anxious individuals was not enhanced 
when they were asked to judge whether they would use the words to 
describe themselves. Smith and colleagues classify this as a nonsocial task 
and as a consequence, is unrelated to schemata that evaluate threat in 
social situations. 
So far, only one study has been found that investigated whether 
clinically severe social phobia is associated with extensive processing of 
social threat cues. Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, and Dombeck (1990) compared 
socially phobic participants with panic disorder patients using the 
modified stroop colour naming task. Socially phobic participants as 
opposed to panic disorder patients selectively attended to negative social-
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evaluative words. The results support the existence of specific schemata 
which facilitate the processing of cues related to social-evaluative concerns 
for socially anxious individuals and physical danger for panic disorder 
patients. It is noteworthy to recognize that this study is preliminary and 
requires replication. 
Bearing in mind that the schemata of the socially anxious person 
effectively filters perceptions and guides judgement then, according to 
Beck's theory, the self-schema of the socially anxious person should also 
facilitate processing aspects of the social environment that are schema-
congruent Several studies lend support to the fact that socially anxious 
individuals process information in a way that confirms their view of 
themselves in social encounters. Accordingly, socially anxious persons 
systematically underestimate their performance in social interactions 
despite the fact that they have the ability to make accurate estimates of 
others' performance (Clark & Arkowitz, 1975). Socially anxious 
individuals also recall an overabundance of negative feedback (O'Banion 
& Arkowitz, 1977) and subsequently view that feedback as more negative 
than non-socially anxious individuals (Smith & Samson, 1975). 
To the extent that schemata promote the processing of consistent or 
relevant information, the schemata may also disrupt the processing of 
conflicting or irrelevant information from the social environment. 
Socially anxious individuals may unwittingly screen out aspects of social 
interactions that are not fundamental for evaluating one's vulnerability 
(Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990). There is evidence that 
socially anxious individuals do not show a preference for similar over 
dissimilar interaction partners (Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985). This 
phenomenon has been repeatedly demonstrated by non-socially anxious 
individuals (Byrne, 1971). 
Thus the schemata of the socially anxious individual make 
information-processing more economical since the individual need not 
rely soley on information available from the environment but also past 
experiences also inform the person what to expect and how to cope. That 
is, the socially anxious person is prepared to focus on what he or she 
perceives as the important aspects of the environment and applies the 
appropriate rules and concepts that dictate his or her interpretations. As a 
result, distortions and biases in information-processing develop. 
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(ii) Cognitive Processes 
Once dominance or threat schemata are triggered, systematic 
distortions or biases in the processing of information occur. The socially 
anxious individual's sense of vulnerability in social situations is 
magnified by these dysfunctional cognitive processes. Several cognitive 
errors most commonly found in anxiety states have been identified by 
Beck and associates (Beck, 1967, 1976; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery 1979), 
including: catastrophizing or dwelling on the worst possible consequence 
of a situation and overestimating the probability of its occurrence; 
personalization or incorrectly taking personal responsibility for negative 
consequences; selective attention/abstraction or selectively focusing on 
negative features of an event while ignoring more important features; 
overgeneralization or global predictions of negative outcomes and 
applying these to situations in general; dichotomous thinking or 
evaluating experiences in only black or white terms; arbitrary inference or 
formulating conclusions on the basis of insufficient evidence; and 
magnification and minimization or gross distortions in the importance of 
events. A study by Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-Wilson (1986) examined 
the negative cognitive distortions proposed by Beck (1967) in the 
information-processing operations of depressed, low self-esteem, and 
evaluation anxiety children. Results showed that depressed, low self-
esteem, and high evaluation anxiety children are more likely to make 
negative cognitive errors (e.g., catastrophizing, overgeneralization, 
selective abstraction, etc.) than their non-depressed, high self-esteem, and 
low evaluation anxiety peers. 
Both childhood and adulthood disorders are associated with 
cognitive deficits and distortions. Kendall (1985) differentiates these two 
propositions suggesting that cognitive distortions represent dysfunctional 
thought processes and their products such as excessive self-talk or 
excessive self-focused attention. Cognitive distortions have the ability to 
confirm and reinforce the socially anxious individual's notion of potential 
threat as well as increasing their heightened vulnerability in social 
situations. Cognitive deficits on the other hand involve deficient or scarce 
adaptive mental skills and abilities or unusually low frequencies of 
beneficial mental activity. Possible examples may include a lack of 
adequate planning or verbal intervention. 
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Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985) conclude that cognitive 
distortions keep the anxious individual from formulating a reasonable 
estimate of either threat or coping resources. Socially anxious individuals 
usually jump to subjective conclusions without substantial or objective 
evidence. They can see similarities and make overgeneralizations 
particularly with themes of threat, uncertainty, and safety in social 
situations. Beck (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) argues that with any 
hint of perceived discomfort or distress, the socially anxious individual 
automatically focus on the worst possible outcome. They selectively 
abstract information from past and present experiences to support such 
dire consequences. Furthermore, Mathews and MacLeod (1987) suggest 
that these biases and distortions in the information processing of socially 
anxious individuals will be evident only when there is competition for 
processing resources. 
Thus socially anxious individuals automatically and selectively 
attend to threatening stimuli in their social environment. In addition, 
when socially anxious individuals are confronted with a feared social 
encounter, studies on self-efficacy report that they experience an increased 
sense of vulnerability and underestimate their ability to cope with the 
situation (Bandura, Adams, & Beyer, 1977). Thus, their constant self-doubt 
locks them in a pattern of self-defeating automatic thoughts. 
(iii) Cognitive Products 
The earliest studies of the content of thought in anxious patients 
was by Beck, Laude, and Bohnert (1974). They conducted open-ended 
interviews with patients who experienced anxiety, including those with 
panic and those without panic attacks. All patients reported thoughts or 
visualisations of death, disease, or social humiliation or embarrassment 
prior to or during their anxiety. According to Beck (1976) automatic 
thoughts are specific and distinct and occur very rapidly. For example, in 
social anxiety the content concerns themes of social threat to oneself 
through thoughts, or visual images of perceived social, psychological, or 
physical harm in social situations. When an individual is experiencing 
anxiety, these thoughts are difficult to ignore, let alone to stop them or 
shut them off. To a socially anxious person, their automatic thoughts 
seem plausible and worthy of belief and therefore, have no reason to 
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doubt them. They are contrary to objective appraisal and generally 
demonstrate greater distortion in reality than other forms of thinking 
(Emery & Tracy, 1987). 
It is hypothesized that these automatic thoughts, both verbal and 
imagery form reflect the content of the underlying schemata (Beck & 
Clark, 1988). The cognitive content that has most commonly been 
associated with social anxiety revolve around the fear of negative 
evaluation, criticism, and rejection in social situations. Thus, socially 
anxious individuals self-verbalizations and internal dialogue of negative 
self-evaluation and self-defeating thoughts reflect the content of their 
social threat-related schemata. The most common reportable 
consequences of the manipulation of the information-processing system 
are, irrational beliefs (Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Goldfried & 
Sobocinski, 1975), negative self-statements (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985; 
Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg, & Holt, 1993; Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979), 
negative self-evaluations (Curran, Wallander, and Fischetti 1980; Clark & 
Arkowitz, 1975; Hartman, 1983), and negative attributional styles, 
especially towards heterosocial interactions (Goldfried, Padawer, & Robins, 
1984; Miller & Arkowitz, 1977; Teglasi & Fagin, 1984). 
The dominance schemata of the socially anxious individual is 
reflected in the self-relevant cognitions he or she is experiencing. That is, 
the content of these cognitions and inhibitions revolve around a 
preponderance of thinking that concerns what others might be thinking 
about them. Hartman (1984) has suggested that the negative self-
statements reported by socially anxious individuals fall into several 
categories: (1) thoughts involving general social inadequacy, (2). others' 
awareness of one's distress, (3) fear of negative evaluation, and (4) over-
perception of arousal and performance. Patterns of self-statements by 
socially anxious individuals have been assessed in a number of studies 
(Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985; Bruch, Mattia, Heimberg, & Holt, 1993; 
Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Hartman, 1984; Heimberg, Acerra, 
& Holstein, 1985; Myszka, Galassi, & Ware, 1986). The assessment of self-
statement patterns is concerned with the more immediate cognitions 
experienced by socially anxious individuals in specific situations. 
Compared to non-socially anxious individuals, socially anxious persons 
have reported more negative self-statements (Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 
1985), and fewer positive self-statements when anticipating a heterosocial 
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interaction (Heimberg, Acerra, & Holstein, 1985). Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, 
and Larsen (1982) have found negative self-statement scores to be 
particularly sensitive to social anxiety. 
The focus of the socially anxious person's appraisal shifts from his 
or her skills to his or her weaknesses or vulnerability. Negative self-
statements made by socially anxious individuals correlate significantly 
with ratings of social skills and anxiety made by external judges. Almost 
always, there is consistency between the cognitive manifestations and the 
behavioural manifestations of vulnerability. The socially anxious 
individual feels vulnerable if he or she believes to lack the important 
social skills necessary to cope with a particular social situation. As a result, 
many difficulties may turn into threats if he or she realises that he or she 
does not have the minimal skills for coping with a problem situation. For 
example, Mandel and Shrauger (1980) asked male participants to read a list 
of either self-enhancing or self-critical self-statements and their initiation 
toward a female peer was evaluated. The results of the study revealed that 
participants who read the self-critical statements not only took a longer 
period of time to start a conversation with the female participant but also 
spent less time interacting with her than participants who experienced 
self-enhancing statements. These results were also replicated with 
anxious and non-anxious participants. 
Accordingly, Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985) suggest that socially 
anxious individuals will react with self-confidence or a sense of 
vulnerability depending on his or her appraisal of their ability to cope 
with the threatening social situation. Thus the socially anxious person's 
feelings of vulnerability make it difficult for him or her to be objective 
about his or her negative self-appraisals. Beck suggests socially anxious 
individuals engage in a self-protective mechanism or a "watch your step" 
(Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985, p. 75) phenomenon. That is, the 
cognitive system of the individual ensures caution by evoking a series of 
self-doubts, negative evaluations, and negative predictions about oneself 
and one's performance. 
A pervasive and consistent theme in the literature is that socially 
anxious individuals almost always rate themselves poorly. The socially 
anxious individual may evaluate his or her performance poorly because 
they do lack the required social skills, because he or she is a poor observer 
of their own performance or ability, because their standards for evaluation 
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are too stringent, and so forth. The perception of the socially anxious 
individual as socially inadequate may be the consequence of a difference in 
attentional focus during social interactions (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985). High socially anxious individuals suffer from an internal focus of 
self-evaluative, self-deprecatory thinking, and overperceptions of 
autonomic arousal. In addition, the socially anxious person is also 
dividing their attention to include others perceptions and evaluations of 
them (Hartman, 1983). Effective social performance requires full attention 
to the task and the socially anxious person is impaired by the effort to 
divide his or her attention between internal cues, external cues, and task 
cues. The activation of self-focusing tendencies is greatest when he or she 
perceives the situation to be highly evaluative. 
Faced with the goal of making a good impression on others, many 
individuals will become socially anxious to the extent that they doubt they 
will do so (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Such doubts may be generated when 
people are uncertain about how to make a good impression, or when 
individuals know how such an impression can be created but their 
perceptions of the situation, their own attributes, skills, and resources lead 
them to believe they cannot achieve the desired goal. Beck, Emery and 
Greenberg (1985) conclude that inhibited speech, thinking, and recall as 
reactions to anxiety distract the individual from the social situation and 
provide supplementary evidence for negative expectations and overly 
negative self-evaluations, at the same time nurturing the vulnerability 
mode. As a result, this set of expectancies leads to social anxiety. 
It is important to note that expectations are based heavily on an 
individual's history of prior experiences and outcomes in the specific 
situations which are associated with anxiety (Carver & Scheier, 1986). 
Research has repeatedly demonstrated that shy individuals, similar to 
socially anxious persons, expect their social behaviour will be inadequate 
and as a consequence, will be negatively evaluated by others (DePaulo, 
Kenny, Hoover, Webb, & Oliver, 1987; Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, 1988). 
For example, Cheek and Stahl (1986) asked college women to write a poem 
after they had completed a shyness inventory. Prior to writing their 
poems, half of the participants were told that their work would be assessed 
for creativity by a panel of poets and that they would receive a copy of the 
evaluations. The other half of the sample were not told they would be 
evaluated. Results showed that shyness correlated -.57 with the creativity 
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ratings of the poems in the evaluation situation whereas the correlation 
in the control condition was only -.13. 
Consequently, socially anxious individuals make interpretations 
and draw inferences from external and internal stimuli regarding the 
status of the self in a hierarchically ordered social group. These inferences 
can be interpreted as expectancies regarding estimates of people's 
evaluations of one's appearance, behaviour and other self-identifying 
characteristics. For most people such expectancies only become prominent 
when the dominance schemata are triggered, especially when attention is 
drawn to the self. The dominance schemata and the consequent 
expectancies and evaluations of the socially anxious person may be ever 
present. A great deal of research has documented the relation between the 
belief or assumption that one lacks the valuable social skills and 
experience to cope with specific situations and social anxiety (Leary, 1982). 
A very early study by Gilkinson (1943, cited in Schlenker & Leary, 1982) 
found that speech anxious students significantly underestimated both 
their speaking ability and the quality of their speeches as compared with 
observers' evaluations of them. Efran and Korn (1969) demonstrated that 
'socially cautious' participants had lower expectations for success than 
'socially bolder' participants on a number of social and verbal tasks. 
Although the two groups did not show differences in expectations for 
success on intellectual, artistic, or athletic domains. 
It appears the negative evaluations of socially anxious individuals 
are confined primarily to themselves. Socially anxious individuals 
systematically underestimate the quality of their social skills (as compared 
with observers' ratings of them and with the self-evaluations of low 
socially anxious persons), but high and low socially anxious participants 
have been found to agree in their appraisals of a confederate's social ability 
(Clark & Arkowitz, 1975). A study by Clark and Arkowitz (1975) required 
male participants to take part in two interactions with female confederates. 
Following the interactions, participants were asked to rate their own and 
others' performance with respect to social skill, anxiety, and the quality of 
the female's responses to them. Objective judges also completed these 
ratings of high and low anxious participants. Ratings of skilfullness of 
their own performance differed to the extent that high anxious 
participants gave themselves significantly lower ratings than they received 
from the judges. In contrast, low anxious participants ratings of their own 
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skill matched the judges ratings. Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to 
note that high anxious participants like low anxious participants, also 
matched judges' ratings of other persons ability with reasonable accuracy. 
These findings have been replicated and extended by Curran, 
Wallander, and Fischetti (1980) who examined the differences in self-
evaluation among socially anxious individuals who evidenced high or 
low social skills. Socially anxious individuals who lacked the appropriate 
social skills gave accurate observations of their performance, whereas the 
anxious participants who were socially skilled consistently underestimated 
judges' ratings of their performance. A study by Cacioppo, Glass, & 
Merluzzi (1979) also found that high socially anxious individuals rated 
themselves more negatively and as less potent and active, and also 
generated significantly more negative self-statements compared to low 
socially anxious participants. 
In accordance with Beck's theory of anxiety, Schlenker and Leary 
(1982) have suggested that socially anxious individuals have 
unrealistically high self-standards. This automatically increases the 
individuals self-doubts that he or she will be able to perform successful 
self-presentations in social situations. Although non-socially anxious 
individuals may also have high self-standards and may even doubt their 
performance, the difference rests in the existence of the dominance 
schemata which turns such doubts into social anxiety (Trower, Gilbert, & 
Sherling, 1990). That is, the threat schemata of the socially anxious person 
contains a representation of the the social world as being critical and 
competitive. Their perception of a world insinuates that powerful and 
assertive self-presentations will lead to success whereas the potential for 
failure are perceived as exceedingly catastrophic. The incongruity between 
self-presentation performances and self-standards causes the socially 
anxious individual's focus of attention to be turned on the self (Carver & 
Scheier, 1986). Thus, a prominent characteristic of the socially anxious is 
high self-consciousness (Buss, 1980). 
Excessive self-consciousness is associated with ineffective social 
performance, reduced sensitivity to other persons, and heightened self-
perceptions of inadequacy in social situations (Christensen, 1982, cited in 
Hartman, 1983). It appears that consuming self-focus prevents the 
awareness of, and misinterprets external events. Awareness of oneself as a 
social being is cognitively demanding and as a result the socially anxious 
24 
person is less sensitive to the behaviour of others in social situations. 
Thus, the socially anxious individual experiences attentionally 
demanding cognitive activity during social interactions. That is, the 
socially anxious person responds to evaluative situations with ruminative 
self-focused attention and cannot direct attention to the effective coping of 
the task. 
A pervasive theme to all of the thoughts and inhibitions that the 
socially anxious individual experiences in social situations is that they are 
largely irrelevant to cognition necessary to efficiently perform in social 
situations. Research has repeatedly identified and demonstrated a 
phenomenon known as the "self-serving bias" in causal attributions. It 
has been suggested that the cognitive pattern in socially anxious persons is 
similar to those observed in depressed people (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985). 
Non-socially anxious individuals tend to attribute their successes to their 
own efforts, abilities, skill, and dispositions whereas they ascribe their 
failures to task difficulties, bad luck or other external circumstances 
(Bradley 1978). This seems plausible considering the individual's motive 
for self-presentation and enhanced self-esteem. With respect to social 
anxiety, evidence suggests otherwise. Socially anxious persons are 
susceptible to a reverse bias in which they attribute failure to personal 
flaws (Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980; Trower & Turland, 1984). 
The socially anxious individual is motivated to make a good 
impression to real or imagined audiences but has doubts that he or she 
will do so (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Taylor and Arnow (1988) have 
observed that socially anxious individuals assume the anxiety they 
experience in some situations marks them as different even thought these 
same situations may arouse anxiety in many of us (e.g., public speaking, 
job interviews, academic examinations, etc.). As a consequence of this 
anxiety, the socially anxious person continues to label themselves in a 
global, absolute, and self-blaming manner. The anxiety experienced by 
socially anxious individuals is heightened by the individual's increased 
awareness of internal states, including thoughts and affect. As a result the 
individual is trapped in a state of self-examination by concentrating on 
their thoughts, feelings, and behaviours such that performance in social 
situations is debilitated. The combination of excessive self-focus, negative 
affect, and impairments of social performance may originate in doubts 
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about self-presentation producing desired reactions from others (Hartman, 
1983). 
Teglasi and Fagin (1984) and Teglasi and Hoffman (1982) have 
provided data to suggest that social anxiety is associated with a reversal of 
the self-serving bias. Teglasi and Hoffman (1982) compared volunteers 
from a university psychology class with respondents to an advertisement 
recruiting shy people. Each participant made attributional ratings for 
positive and negative outcomes of social and task oriented scenarios. For 
the social scenario only, shy participants took more personal responsibility 
for negative outcomes and less responsibility for positive outcomes than 
the participants who were not shy. 
Accordingly, the socially anxious individual is characteristically 
locked into the threat or dominance schemata which controls 
information-processing, and in particular the type of expectancies, 
inferences, and attributions the individual makes. Trower, Gilbert, and 
Sherling (1990) suggest that such inferences associate some aspect of an 
individuals behaviour, appearance, or other self-identifying attribute to a 
negative evaluation of his or her self-presentation behaviour by others. 
The motivation behind these inferences rest on more important 
assumptions intrinsic in the dominance schemata which give them their 
meaning. The theme of these assumptions include the fear of social 
disapproval, rejection, and abandonment. 
A study by Miller and Arkowitz (1977) failed to find similar support 
for the relation between attributional patterns and social anxiety. High 
and low socially anxious male participants were asked to take part in two 
5-minute conversations with a female confederate (who was informed to 
behave in a cold or warm manner). High socially anxious males were 
hypothesized to attribute failure (confederate coldness) to themselves and 
success to the situation (confederate warmth). Yet the study failed to 
prove the hypothesis correct. The Miller and Arkowitz (1977) study 
differed from studies by Teglasi and colleagues in that they utilized actual 
interaction situations rather than imagined scenarios. Bearing this in 
mind, the socially anxious participants may have been poor observers of 
the differences between the confederate's friendly and distant behaviour 
(Hope, Cansler, & Heimberg, 1989). 
A socially anxious individual's sense of low self-efficacy in 
combination with their tendency to overpeceive themselves as the focus 
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of others' attention, may make the reversal of the self-serving bias a viable 
strategy for impression management (Hope, Cansler, & Heimberg, 1989). 
For example, if the socially anxious person fails in a social situation other 
people will undoubtedly notice. Therefore it is better to acknowledge the 
failure than to make a further mistake by not recognizing the first failure. 
Consequently, if the social situation is a success, then the socially anxious 
person will not take credit for the success because they fear that others will 
expect them to perform as equally well in future interactions. Hope, 
Gansler, and Heimberg (1989) suggest that the reversal of the self-serving 
bias serves as a self-handicapping strategy created to limit the possible 
damage to self-presentation as well as reduce others expectations of them 
in future situations. 
The above data are consistent with Beck's hypothesized 
vulnerability mode. The verbal reports of socially anxious persons suggest 
that they possess attentional bias and distortions and define themselves as 
having the inability to cope with the situation at hand and as likely 
victims of negative evaluation. Assessment of Beck's theory through self-
report of thoughts and self-statements can provide only indirect evidence 
of the existence of anxiety schemata because only the verbal co~tent of 
cognitive activity is examined rather than actual information-processing 
styles. 
Although the above studies are consistent with the cognitive 
model, many failed to include a group of patients or participants with an 
anxiety disorder other than social anxiety. For this reason, it is difficult to 
determine if the results observed in these studies are unique to social 
anxiety or an attribute of anxiety disorders in general. Also many studies 
have restricted methods of identifying the thoughts that are characteristic 
of social anxiety. Moreover, a variety of studies only go so far as to 
measure the frequency of thoughts in social situations ignoring the 
content of those thoughts. 
It must be noted that developmental factors have important 
consequences for all aspects of the information-processing system in 
childhood social anxiety. With the advancement of childhood cognition, 
cognitive structures and their content as well as cognitive processing are 
each likely to change with development. Anxiety-related cognitive 
distortions and thoughts are also likely to alter, subject to the child's level 
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of development. Although minimal and insufficient research exists on 
the information processing styles of socially anxious children and children 
in general, several adult studies do offer indirect support for Beck's 
approach. 
Criticisms of Beck's Cognitive Theory of Anxiety 
Beck's theoretical proposal can be credited as the first systematic 
attempt to provide a comprehensive cognitive theory of anxiety (Eysenck, 
1992). Although Beck's cognitive theory is a valuable contribution to the 
understanding of anxiety disorders it has been criticised on many 
occasions for its lack of specificity. Eysenck (1992) has pointed out several 
flaws and weaknesses of the information-processing theory of anxiety. 
A valuable part of Beck's theory is the concept of the hierarchically 
ordered schemata that guide the processing of threat-related information. 
It is suggested by Eysenck (1992) that the study of information-processing 
operations needs to be more specific than what has previously been done 
by Beck and colleagues (1985, 1988). For example, he has suggested that the 
processing of information consistent with the anxious schemata is less 
extensive in scope than is suggested by the schemata theory. Evidence 
suggests that anxious persons do not show biases in their retrieval efforts 
of schemata congruent information (Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1987). 
The validity of Beck's theoretical structure raises some criticisms. 
The concept of the schemata used within the theory is vague and often 
considered to mean little more than a belief, an attitude, or an 
assumption. Such vagueness is of considerable importance when 
attempting to evaluate the theory. The notion proposed by Beck and Clark 
(1988) that maladaptive threat or danger schemas motivate anxious 
individuals to selectively attend to threat-related information that is 
congruent with active schemata has been contradicted by other data. For 
example, studies have found that individuals pay more attention to 
information that is inconsistent with expectations (Berlyne, 1960), and 
attend to stimuli that is incongruent with one's active schema for a longer 
period of time than stimuli that is consistent with one's schemata 
(Friedman, 1979). 
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Eysenck (1992) also argues that although Beck insists there may be 
people who do possess maladaptive threat schemata and as a result, have a 
vulnerability for developing intense anxiety, he has failed to pinpoint 
these individuals and engage in prospective studies to determine any 
possible predispositions. 
The assumption that 'normal' thinking is more rational, logical, 
and realistic than anxious or depressive thinking is disputable on a 
number of grounds. Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-Wilson (1986) suggest 
that non-depressed, high self-esteem, and low evaluation anxiety children 
may make the same inferential errors in thinking but in opposite 
directions. The social psychological literature emphasizes that most 
children and adults are biased in a self-enhancing manner (Bradley, 1978; 
Fischer & Leitenberg, 1986; Myers, 1990). 
Depressed and anxious individuals may be more accurate with 
negative information that is actually correct because the conclusions they 
draw are compatible with their model of a negative view of themselves. 
In contrast, non-depressed and non-anxious individuals are much more 
precise with accurate positive information because the assumptions they 
draw are congruent with their positive representation of the self. Thus, 
one's belief can influence one's reasoning. This poses problems for 
therapy as depressed and anxious individuals are unfortunately correct 
about some of the negative aspects regarding themselves and the 
situation, but are clearly wrong about many of the positive aspects with 
respect to themselves and the situation. 
A simple yet important part of research that has been neglected by 
Beck is the failure to include data from non-anxious control groups. A 
non-anxious comparison group is an essential part of research to obtain 
valid and significant reports of the specific cognitive processing of anxious 
individuals. 
Another weakness of Beck's theory is the issue of causality, in that 
maladaptive or 'non-normal' cognitive functioning is the first sign of the 
onset of clinical anxiety eventually causing disturbances in behavioural 
and somatic areas (Eysenck, 1992). Eysenck (1992) suggests that Beck fails to 
consider that not all aspects of non-normal functioning are related to 
anxiety in the same way. For example, self-defeative thinking and anxious 
thoughts may be a part of the anxiety disorder itself, whereas automatic 
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selective attention to threat or danger stimuli may be part of a 
predisposition to clinically severe anxiety (Eysenck, 1992). 
It has also been suggested that Beck and colleagues (1985, 1988) use 
of introspective evidence is limited in that distortions in data can easily 
occur. This makes available evidence questionable with respect to its 
validity and reliability. 
3. Developmental Factors 
Social anxiety has been defined primarily as an adult disorder and 
has not been extensively investigated in childhood. Research pertaining 
to the development of social anxiety in childhood is scarce and no other 
studies to date have specifically examined the relationship between social 
anxiety, biased information-processing, and cognitions in children. The 
most important consideration when studying the anxiety of children is 
that they are continually growing and maturing both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Children's physical growth, emotional growth, social 
growth, and cognitive growth are systematically developing and changing. 
As a result of developmental change, at different ages and stages children 
manifest differences in fear and anxiety reactions. A child's age can 
influence his or her ability to experience or express socially anxious 
feelings. Moreover, the way these anxious feelings are expressed change 
with the development of the child. Furthermore, the expression of 
socially anxious feelings at one age is dependent on prior maturational 
changes at an earlier point in time. 
Cognitive Development and Social Anxiety 
Developmental factors can have significant effects for all aspects of 
the information-processing system in childhood anxiety. For example 
cognitive structures such as the self- and other schemata of the child are 
likely to dramatically change with development. With cognitive 
development, children's schemata undergo considerable elaboration, and 
possible qualitative reorganization of these structures must also be 
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considered. The cognitive processes of self-focused attention or automatic 
questioning of negative or worrisome possibilities in social situations is 
likely to be determined by the level of development cognitive operations 
and structures (Vasey, 1993). Moreover, a child's level of development 
has clear implications for what the child can imagine in the way of threats. 
The observable social anxiety-related distortions in cognition are 
dependent on, or modified by the attainment of specific levels of 
development. 
The content of children's fears and anxieties differ markedly with 
developmental age. In young children anxiety is related to external, 
physical threats such as fear of monsters, the dark, and animals whereas 
the anxiety of older children is primarily related to internal and abstract 
threats such as concerns about social interaction (Kendall & Ronan, 1990). 
The progression from external, physical anxiety to internal, abstract 
anxiety reflects the development of children in various cognitive and 
social-cognitive areas, including the development in cognitive structures 
and information-processing operations. Research has demonstrated that 
the content of adult social anxiety is predominantly related to threats to 
the social self (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; Mathews, 1990). 
This also appears to be the case in childhood. For example, Vasey (1993) 
questioned children from ages 6 to 12 about worries in various situations 
and found that 90% of the worries reported related to threats to the self 
rather than to others. Therefore, it appears logical to assume that the 
cognitive content of social anxiety is linked with the development of 
children's self-understanding and self-concept due to the fact that the 
concept of social anxiety is fundamentally related to threats to the self. 
The development of self-concept is mediated through development in a 
variety of cognitive and social-cognitive areas. 
The content of the thoughts of socially anxious and non-socially 
anxious children reflect developmental changes in their perceptions of 
themselves as well as their physical and social environment (Vasey, 1993). 
Prior to 8 years of age, children tend to perceive themselves primarily in 
"physicalistic" terms with respect to their bodies and belongings (Selman, 
1980). Changes in children's understanding of their self-concept occur at 
approximately 8 years of age (Damon & Hart, 1982). Research has . 
demonstrated that the content of children's worries develop from 
physicalistic threats to psychological threats. For example, Vasey (1993) 
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cites a number of studies that have found increases in psychological 
distress (Miller, Barrett, Hampe, & Noble, 1972) and social and academic 
fears (Lapouse & Monk, 1959) as children become preadolescent. It is at 
this age when children become capable of engaging in social comparison 
and develop the ability to consider the way that others may evaluate them. 
The socially anxious child's awareness of other person's evaluations as 
related to their behavioural competence become increasingly important in 
the development of their self-concept as well as the development of social 
anxiety. 
An important component of social anxiety is the fear of negative 
evaluation. This requires the ability to engage in social comparison as 
well as the competence to consider the manner that others may evaluate 
them in social situations. The worrisome thoughts that the socially 
anxious individual has in these situations are primarily social evaluative 
in nature (e.g., fear of failure, criticism, humiliation, and rejection and 
their social consequences). Various studies have suggested that older 
children as opposed to younger children tend to report more fear of 
failure, criticism and so on than their younger counterparts (Ollendick, 
Matson, & Helset 1985; Vasey, 1993). 
Because the content of thought is mainly social-evaluative among 
socially anxious adults and older children, it is doubtful that the thoughts 
of children younger than 8 years of age reveal worries concerning social 
evaluation. This is due to the fact that young children do not possess the 
necessary social comparison and other person perspective-taking abilities 
for such anxiety. Vasey (1993) suggests that the self-concept of very young 
children revolves around absolute standards where upon they are more 
Hkely to worry about not completing a task successfully rather than with 
the negative evaluation and criticism of others. Thus the content of 
children's social anxiety-related cognitions is a reflection ot and 
dependent on their level of social and cognitive development. 
To the extent that social anxiety is defined as social evaluative in 
nature by DSM-III-R (APA, 1987t then it is impracticable for very young 
children to experience the worry-related thoughts of social anxiety prior to 
the development of a sense of their social selt and other person 
perspective-taking abilities. This is significant for distinguishing between 
the anxiety-related cognitive processes and the content of social anxiety. 
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In order for a child to mediate social anxiety, it seems clear that the 
development of certain abilities is imperative. More specifically, 
developmental changes in childhood are essential for the cognitive 
representation of social anxiety and how children may mediate anxiety 
reactions through their own worrisome thoughts. Vasey (1993) suggested 
that at least two cognitive operations are necessary in order for the child to 
worry about being negatively evaluated. Socially anxious children must 
be capable of conceptualizing and anticipating future events. For socially 
anxious children, to have the ability to anticipate only one threatening 
possibility such as remembering a humiliating or distressing interaction 
with other people and considering its possible recurrence in future social 
situations, is sufficient to produce anxiety in social situations. 
Additionally, the child must also be capable of going beyond what is 
observable and consider what is possible (Vasey, 1993). That is, the child 
must have the ability to elaborate catastrophic possibilities. Beck and 
Emery (1985) argued that social anxiety is characterised by and dependent 
on the ability to catastrophize about possible negative social situations. 
The socially anxious person exaggerates the likelihood and magnitude of 
the potential negative consequences of many social situations. Therefore 
the expression of social anxiety in childhood is dependent on prior 
maturational changes at an earlier point in time. 
For example, the fear of negative evaluation is fundamentally an 
anticipatory process and its occurrence is subject to the child's ability to 
reason about the future. Before the ages of 7 to 8, children possess a 
limited ability to consider the future (Vasey, 1993). After the age of 8, 
children's perspective and understanding of the future becomes much 
more elaborate and is reflected in their language ability (Vasey, 1993). 
Therefore, during childhood it is important to consider the developing 
abilities of the child to conceptualize the future and the implications these 
abilities have on the way a child can become anxious through his or her 
own cognitions in social situations. 
To the extent that social anxiety involves reasoning about future 
threatening possibilities and the evaluation of all possible failure 
situations, the ability to anticipate and reason about hypothetical events is 
also crucial in order for a child to worry in social situations (Vasey, 1993). 
More importantly, without this ability the child could not possibly engage 
in the process of catastrophic thinking which is an essential component of 
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social anxiety reactions. Piaget (1987, cited in Vasey, 1993) contests that as 
children's cognitive development advances there is a qualitative change 
and enhancement in their ability to hypothesize about the possible. For 
example, in his work on possibility Piaget argues that children in the 
preoperational stage (2-7 years) have little ability to anticipate and are 
capable of creating only a limited number of possible solutions. Children 
in the concrete operational stage (7-11 years) have the ability to engage in 
deductive reasoning and are capable of comprehending several 
possibilities at once. To the extent that these children are capable of 
considering a number of possibilities at this stage, they remain finite but 
they are completely anticipatory. Children in this stage become capable of 
elaborating catastrophic possibilities because the ability to anticipate 
several threatening possibilities is a prerequisite for worry to mediate 
social anxiety. In the formal operational phase (11+ years) children 
develop the ability to anticipate unlimited possibilities that may be new or 
based on prior experience. With the advancement of anticipatory and 
deductive reasoning processes, children have the ability to conceive 
infinite possibilities. Vasey (1993) suggested that as children's ability to 
conceptualize sequences of negative outcomes increases, so too does the 
severity and generality of evaluation-mediated anxiety. 
Mathews (1990) suggested that cognitive operations such as 
anticipation and reasoning about negative possibilities, interact with 
cognitive structures to create the process of anxiety. An important aspect 
of the information-processing system is the structure of memory which 
undergoes significant changes with development. That is, the 
organisation of children's memories is dependent on levels of 
development. For example, young children's memories are schematically 
organised in a manner which reflect event representations or scripts 
whereas children older than 7 to 8 years of age possess a memory structure 
that supports the type of spreading activation described in theories of 
anxiety (Mathews, 1990). Thus, schematic relationships are replaced by 
categorical relationships where upon threatening information is organised 
as a collective body in which thoughts about one type of threat stimulate 
thoughts about other threat-related possibilities through spreading 
activation. 
This notion is in accordance with current cognitive theories of 
social anxiety which assume that information is organized around a 
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theme of threat (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). The theme of threat is 
regarded as a categorical relationship in which the perceptual and/ or 
functional "sameness" shared by all information in the network is 
organised around such a theme (Mathews, 1990; Mathews & Eysenck, 
1987). Therefore for a child to experience the cognitive components of 
social anxiety, it is necessary that they possess the facilitative effects of 
associative priming. 
When attempting to apply adult models of biased or distorted 
information-processing operations to children, developmental differences 
are important considerations. Research has demonstrated that socially 
anxious individual's attentional processes are biased towards the 
perception of threat-related information in social situations (e.g., Hope, 
Rapee, Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990; MacLeod, Williams, & Bekerian, 
1991). Eysenck (1992) suggests that these attentional biases are associated 
with the anxious persons accessible memory structures in combination 
with anxious mood. As a result of the differences in the organisation of 
cognitive structures across developmental ages, attentional biases may 
differ as well. For example, Vasey (1993) suggests young children may 
show specific attentional bias related to specific event representations 
whereas the category based network of older children support general 
biases towards threats. Again, level of cognition controls the association 
between threat-related possibilities in social situations and a child's 
elaborate memories and thoughts that may be loosely related but share a 
common link to anxious mood and threatening qualities. 
The cognitive perspective rests on the assumption that both adults 
and children are problem solvers and efficient processors of information. 
In this sense, the way in which children control their cognitive processing 
is critical. Kendall and Ronan (1990) have emphasized several major 
distortions in childhood social anxiety especially, misperception of 
demands from the social situation, extreme self-criticism, underestimating 
one's skills and abilities, and excessive self-focused attention. Both deficits 
and distortions are assumed to play a significant role in the aetiology and 
maintenance of childhood social anxiety. It is more likely that 
internalizing problems such as social anxiety in childhood are related to 
distortions rather than deficits because distortions lead to overcontrolled 
behaviour (e.g., inhibition due to misperceived threat or underestimation 
of one's coping abilities), whereas deficits are primarily related to a lack of 
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self-control skills (Kendall, 1985; Kendall & Ronan, 1990). A study by 
Kendall, Stark, and Adam (1990) supports this distinction demonstrating 
that childhood depression is associated with distortions linked to self-
evaluations but is not related to self-control deficits. It must be noted that 
the majority of children do not develop problems with severe anxiety in 
social situations simply because the have the ability of considering a 
variety of catastrophic consequences. Vasey (1993) argued that only those 
children who have anxiety-promoting cognitive deficits or distortions are 
at risk for developing social anxiety. This is consistent with other 
cognitive theories of adult anxiety (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). 
In order to identify the role of distortions in childhood social 
anxiety, it is important to consider how children usually cope with 
worrisome thoughts or anxious feelings in social situations. Available 
evidence shows that the coping strategies children use to deal with anxiety 
significantly vary depending on their level of development (Carter & 
Crnic, 1991). Among children aged 5 to 12, Carter and Crnic (1991) found 
that as children become older, their cognitive coping strategies become 
more prevalent. As cognitive development progresses, children 
increasingly gain the ability to change the way in which they process 
threat-related events and situations. For example, Dodge (1989) contends 
that as children mature, they not only gain the capability to engage in 
selective abstraction and anticipation to avoid threatening stimuli, but 
they also become better at discriminating threatening and nonthreatening 
cues to ease unnecessary anxiety and prepare coping strategies. 
Nevertheless, research consistently shows that these attributes are 
impaired among socially anxious adults (MacLeod, Williams & Berkerian, 
1991) and similar impairments may generalise to socially anxious 
children. Thus such biases as selective attention have the clear potential 
to play an important role in the maintenance of social anxiety especially 
consciously mediated processes. 
It is believed that children who are hypersensitive to social anxiety 
also become convinced of their incompetence in coping with their 
reactions. For example, in social situations where socially anxious 
children believe they are incapable of dealing with their anxiety, they 
become hypervigilent for even subtle cues of criticism or negative 
evaluation and as a result, become anxious when they occur. Kendall and 
Ronan (1990) hypothesize that anxious children may misinterpret 
36 
environmental cues. Several studies have found that when presented 
with vignettes describing ambiguous situations, or word and sentences 
that may have several meanings anxious adults interpret these situations 
as more threatening than nonanxious adults (Butler & Mathews, 1983; 
Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1987; Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & 
Mathews, 1991). That is, distorted interpretations and perceptions of 
environmental cues become increasingly important in the aetiology and 
maintenance of childhood social anxiety. 
A Developmental Theory of Social Anxiety 
During childhood the development of cognition carries the 
potential for children to mediate social anxiety in a variety of social 
situations. The cognitive-developmental perspective as described above, 
suggests that developmental changes in social anxiety are based on 
changes in a child's cognitive skills and abilities. This empirical support is 
consistent with Buss' (1980) theory on the development of fearful and self-
conscious (social anxiety) shyness. A focus of attention on oneself as a 
social object (public self-consciousness) is important for the experience of 
social anxiety. A major feature of socialization training is public self-
awareness. That is, many children are taught that others are observing 
them, evaluating their appearance, manners, and other social behaviour. 
Rothbart and Mauro (1990) believe that it would be conceptually simpler 
to incorporate social anxiety (as related to evaluation) with the theory of 
self-conscious rather than fearful shyness, as self-conscious shyness 
develops later than infancy at a time when the child is able to comprehend 
and is aware of the evaluations of others. Similar to social anxiety, self-
conscious shyness is a cognitive reaction requiring acute awareness of 
oneself as a social object which involves feeling excessively exposed to the 
scrutiny of others. On the other hand, fearful shyness is more of a 
physiological or somatic form of anxiety. 
Buss suggests that self-conscious shyness is later-developing and 
involves the awareness of oneself as a social object. Further, he suggests 
this particular type of shyness involves extreme sensitivity of one's public 
self, inhibition or disorganisation of social behaviour when one is exposed 
to the scrutiny and evaluation of others. This kind of shyness emerges 
around the age of 5 years where the child possesses the appropriate 
37 
cognitive capabilities that enable him or her to have a sense of themselves 
as social beings. This is consistent with the development of children's 
cognition and the development of social anxiety, as described earlier. Self-
conscious shyness may be the product of the combination between being 
scrutinized and being criticized or humiliated, as well as an individual's 
feeling of being conspicuous or uniquely different on the basis of race, 
gender, physical appearance, speech, manners, clothes, or other 
distinguishing attributes. Buss contests that self-conscious shyness is more 
likely to be elicited in formal situations that emphasise the status of the 
participants and that are public where one is open to the scrutiny of others 
and one's self-awareness. 
The cause of self-conscious shyness is likely to be excessive 
socialization training in the importance of the social self (Buss, 1986). 
Some children are continually being reminded about how others are 
evaluating them, and how important proper appearance and manners are 
by their parents. After constant reminders of one's faults and 
misconducts, the child is likely to develop a negative sense of himself or 
herself as a social being and become extremely self-conscious. An 
empirical test by Bruch (1989) found that social phobics as opposed to 
agoraphobics reported greater public self-consciousness and were more 
likely than agoraphobics to label themselves as shy. This finding for acute 
self-consciousness among socially anxious persons is consistent with Buss' 
speculations that significant developmental changes in early adolescence 
may stimulate social evaluative concerns and disrupt success in social 
relations. 
Cognitive-developmental explanations for the development of 
social anxiety combine intellectual development and social-emotional 
responses by suggesting that there are specific cognitive requirements for 
social discrimination. Self-conscious shyness involves public self-
awareness and is believed by Buss to develop when the child has attained 
an "advanced, cognitive self" (Buss, 1985, p. 43). The social cognitive 
literature has suggested that a child's concept of the self develops 
approximately between the ages of 7 to 9 (Rholes & Ruble, 1984; Rotenberg, 
1982). As children's cognition regarding the self becomes more 
sophisticated, Rothbart and Mauro (1990) suggest that they will become 
increasingly vulnerable to negative thoughts and evaluations associated 
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with their self-worth. Evidence suggests this is often the case (Darby & 
Schlenker, 1986; Harter, 1983). 
With respect to temperament and social anxiety, it appears that 
early-developing, fearful shyness is temperamentally based whereas later-
developing self-conscious shyness is much more a feature of personality 
(Rothbart & Mauro, 1990). An explanation for this is that self-conscious 
shyness is believed to be more strongly influenced and determined by 
experience, the epitome of the self, and is associated with a distinct 
cognitive framework. In contrast, fearful shyness is very early-developing 
and does not appear to be manipulated by the experience of criticism or 
ridicule. 
Thus, in accordance with Buss' theory of the development of self-
conscious and fearful shyness, children become capable of mediating social 
anxiety in social situations as the relevant cognitive structures and 
cognitive operations develop. In addition to developmental changes in 
the process of social anxiety, development in children's understanding of 
the self and of others contributes to changes in the content of their 
thoughts. 
4. Experimental Design and Predictions 
The present study has several major goals. Firstly, the symptoms 
associated with social anxiety are assessed in children to determine if social 
anxiety can be manifest in childhood. Secondly, several assumptions from 
Beck's (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) cognitive theory of anxiety are 
tested. Of interest here is the relation between social anxiety and biased or 
distorted cognitive information-processing, and whether socially anxious 
children react with negative cognitive errors following different 
situations. From this, assumptions can be drawn regarding the role of the 
schemata in social anxiety. Thirdly, the relation between distorted 
information-processing and self-defeating cognitions and inhibitions (e.g., 
negative self-evaluations, self-statement patterns, attributions, etc.) is also 
examined. Inferences concerning the self-perceptions and self-concept of 
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socially anxious children can be made. No other studies to date have 
specifically examined the relationship between social anxiety, biased 
information-processing, and cognitions in children. The cognitive 
information-processing operations of socially anxious children are 
examined by the current study because the cognitive component which 
includes expectations of negative evaluation from others or from the self 
appears to be the primary factor of, and unique to the social anxiety 
construct. 
Design Features 
The current study assesses a sample of primary school students (9-11 
years of age) on the basis of a screening inventory for characteristics 
associated with social anxiety in social situations. Children were divided 
into socially anxious and non-socially anxious groups depending on 
whether their anxiety score coincided with the low and high cutoff criteria. 
Both high socially anxious children and low socially anxious children 
completed two cognitive performance tasks, a mathematics test and an 
impromptu speech. The design of this study was strengthened by making 
use of two different anxiety-eliciting situations: one social (impromptu 
speech), and one social-academic (mathematics test). Prior to, and 
following each task, the children were asked to complete a performance 
questionnaire. This questionnaire assessed each child's expectations and 
self-evaluations of their performance on the mathematics test and the 
speech. Following this, the children were asked to complete three 
questionnaires which assessed the cognitive processing of information 
and their cognitions and inhibitions in social situations using 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios. The technique of using 
hypothetical events in this type of research has some support (Arnkoff & 
Glass, 1989). In addition, the children's teacher was also asked to complete 
a questionnaire that assessed the behaviour of each child in the classroom. 
The present study makes use of a within subjects design, and the 
sample was drawn from a population of primary school students. The 
design incorporates a naturalistic setting, using the school environment 
and aspects of the analyses are correlational. The study is also longitudinal 
to the extent that variables are measured before and after two different 
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cognitive tasks, a mathematics test and an impromptu speech. The nature 
of this design has an advantage in that the relationships between the 
individual difference measures (social anxiety), and the various cognitive 
information-processing variables (negative cognitive errors e.g., 
catastrophizing, selective abstraction, overgeneralizing, etc.) following 
negative events can be examined, and their possible effects on cognition 
(e.g., negative evaluations, maladaptive attributions, negative self-
statement patterns, etc.) can be determined. 
Summary of Predictions 
Social Anxiety 
1. Participants who experience extreme forms of anxiety in social-
evaluative situations will score significantly higher on the Social Phobia 
and Anxiety Inventory (SP AI, see Appendix I) (Turner, Dancu, & Beidel, 
1984) than participants who do not experience social anxiety in social 
interactions. 
2. Participants who are highly socially anxious will display more biases or 
distortions in cognitive information-processing for negative events as 
measured by the Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire 
(CNCEQ, see Appendix III) (Leitenberg, Yost & Carroll-Wilson, 1986) than 
children who are not socially anxious. 
3. High socially anxious children will report a higher proportion of 
negative self-statements than children low in social anxiety. 
4. Children who are highly socially anxious will report a lower quantity of 
positive self-statements than children low in social anxiety. 
That is, compared to non-socially anxious children, socially anxious 
children will report more negative self-statements than positive self-
statements regarding themselves and their performance. 
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5. Children high in social anxiety will report overly negative expectations 
and evaluations of their social performance on the mathematics test and 
impromptu speech than low socially anxious children. 
6. High socially anxious participants will report significantly less positive 
expectations and evaluations than non-socially anxious participants 
regarding their social performance on the mathematics test and the 
impromptu speech. 
That is, high socially anxious children will underestimate positive aspects 
of their performance and overestimate negative aspects com.pared with 
low socially anxious children. 
7. Socially anxious children will report pathological patterns of attribution 
for the causes of social success and failure. More specifically, they will 
report more stable, internal, and global attributions for failure and more 
unstable, external, and specific attributions for success than their non-
socially anxious peers. 
Cognitive Information-Processing 
1. Participants who negatively distort the processing of information will 
display a pattern of self-defeating negative cognitions regarding 
them.selves and their performance in social-evaluative situations. 
Cognitive Products/Automatic Thoughts 
1. Children who report significantly more negative cognitions will show 
impairments in performance on the m.athem.atics test. 
The current study sought to test these predictions concerning the 
cognitive information-processing operations of socially anxious and non-
socially anxious children and draw inferences regarding their self-




One hundred twenty-seven children attending Standard-3 and 
Standard-4 in six public primary schools in the Christchurch area 
participated in this study. These children were selected from schools that 
agreed to take part in the study. Participants were recruited on a volunteer 
basis with parents giving consent for their child's participation. These 
children were asked to complete a modified version of the Social Phobia 
and Anxiety Inventory (SP AI, see Appendix I) developed by Turner, 
Dancu and Beidel (1984). This measure specifically identifies those 
children who experience symptoms characteristic of social anxiety. The 
children were divided into socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
groups on the basis of the SP AI screening inventory. Conservative cutoff 
scores were used to minimise the percentage of false positive and negative 
rates. A score less than 30 on the SPAI met the criteria for inclusion into 
the non-socially anxious group and scores greater than 70 constituted the 
socially anxious group (Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). Six 
participants failed to complete the survey correctly and were excluded 
from the study. The mean age of both the socially anxious children and 
the non-socially anxious children in this sample was 9.7 and 10.0 years, 
respectively. The screening survey identified a final sample consisting of 
51 children, 27 boys and 24 girls. 
Materials 
The aim of this study was to investigate the cognitions of socially 
anxious children, especially the way in which they think about, and 
perceive themselves and their performance compared to non-socially 
anxious individuals. It was expected that socially anxious children would 
have overly negative distortions about themselves and their performance. 
More specifically, they would display negative self-statement patterns, 
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negative self-evaluations of themselves and their performance, and 
attributional styles similar to those displayed by depressed individuals. 
Therefore, the tests used in this study were chosen not only to identify 
socially anxious children from non-socially anxious children, but also to 
identify and measure any differences in cognition that exist between these 
two groups. The test battery used is as follows: 
1. Assessment of Social Anxiety 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory 
The Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SP AI, see Appendix I) 
(Turner, Dancu, & Beidel, 1985) is a 45-item instrument designed to assess 
the severity of specific somatic symptoms and cognitions associated with 
· social anxiety and social phobia. The SP AI also measures avoidance and 
escape behaviours across a wide range of fear-producing social situations. 
Specifically, the SPAI was designed as a more specific measure of social 
anxiety in an adult population however, it was modified accordingly for a 
sample of children. The SP AI has been used in clinical psychology and 
psychiatry to assess the intensity of social anxiety in psychiatric patients 
(Beidel, Borden, Turner, & Jacob, 1989), and for detecting possible social 
anxiety in normal populations (Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). 
The inventory has high test-retest reliability and good internal consistency 
(Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989). In the present study, the SPAI 
specifically identified and differentiate those children who experience the 
characteristics associated with social anxiety in social situations from 
children who do not experience symptoms of anxiety when engaging in 
social situations. This allowed the current study to compare socially 
anxious children with non-socially anxious children for any possible 
differences on measures of cognition. 
2. Cognitive Assessment 
Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire 
The Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CNCEQ, 
see Appendix III) (Leitenberg, Yost & Carroll-Wilson, 1986) is a 24-item 
measure of four types of negative cognitive errors drawn from Beck's 
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(1976, 1979) cognitive theory of depression. The 4 types of negative 
cognitive errors assessed by the CNCEQ are: (1) selective attention or 
selectively focusing on negative features of an event; (2) 
overgeneralization or global predictions of negative outcomes and 
applying these to situations in general; (3) catastrophizing or dwelling on 
the worst possible outcome of an event and overestimating the probability 
of its occurrence; and (4) or personalization incorrectly taking personal 
responsibility for negative consequences. Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-
Wilson, (1986) report on the psychometric properties of the CNCEQ with 
high internal consistency. This study found that depressed, low self-
esteem, and high evaluation-anxiety children are more likely to endorse 
Beck's (1979) negative cognitive errors than their non-depressed, high self-
esteem and low evaluation-anxiety counterparts. The study also 
demonstrated that the scale was applicable for use with anxious children. 
Use of this inventory allowed one to detect any possible differences and 
distortions in cognitive information-processing between socially anxious 
and non-socially anxious children in the current study. 
Social Interaction Self-Statement Test 
The Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST, see Appendix IV) 
(Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982) assesses negative and positive 
self-statements relevant to social interaction situations. The measure 
consists of 30 items, half of which assess the frequency of negative 
thoughts (e.g., "I hope I don't make a fool of myself"), while the other half 
assess the frequency of positive thoughts (e.g., "We probably have a lot in 
common"). Participants are asked to indicate how frequently they have 
each thought in a social situation. Frequency ratings are summed to yield 
positive and negative self-statement composite scores. Zweig and Brown 
(1985) report adequate internal consistency and concurrent validity for 
both positive and negative subscales following an imagined stimulus 
situation. Furthermore, negative thoughts on the SISST were 
significantly correlated with social anxiety, fear of negative evaluation and 
public self-consciousness. The SISST has also been shown to discriminate 
socially anxious from non-socially anxious individuals (Beidel, Turner, & 
Dancu, 1985; Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982; Turner, Beidel, & 
Larkin, 1986). The SISST is the most frequently used structured self-
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statement instrument in social anxiety research (Arnkoff & Glass, 1989). 
Although this questionnaire was designed to assess an adult population, it 
was altered to address a group of children. The SISST enabled the current 
study to assess the frequency of derogatory and facilitative self-statements 
and self-thoughts of socially anxious and non-socially anxious children in 
social situations. 
Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ) 
The Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire (CASQ, see 
Appendix V) (Kaslow, Tanenbaum, & Seligman, 1978) was used to 
evaluate the way in which children attribute causality to good and bad 
events. The CASQ consists of 24 items. Each item contains a hypothetical 
situation (e.g., "You get good grades") and two attributions explaining why 
each event might have occurred (e.g., "I am a hard worker" vs. 
"Schoolwork is simple"). Children are asked to choose the alternative that 
best describes why the event happened to them. Half of the situations 
represent "good" outcomes and half of the situations represent "bad" 
outcomes. Eight questions apply to each of the three attributional 
dimensions - internality, stability, and globality. The CASQ has six basic 
subscales with four items on each: (1) Good-Internal/External, (2) Good-
Stable/Unstable, (3) Good-Specific/Global, (4) Bad-Internal/External, (5) 
Bad-Stable/Unstable, (6) Bad-Specific/Global. Data gathered from each of 
the six subscales plus the overall composite score were individually 
analysed to provide more specific information on the participant's 
attributional style. The use of this scale permitted the current study to 
investigate any differences that may exist between socially anxious and 
non-socially anxious children in terms of attribution style for the 
consequences of events. More specifically, to determine if socially anxious 
children would react to negative outcomes with more internal, stable, and 
global attributions than non-socially anxious children, and more external, 
unstable, and specific attributions for successful outcomes than their non-
socially anxious peers. 
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3. Behavioural Assessment 
Social Interaction Rating Scale (SIRS) 
The Social Interaction Scale (SIRS, see Appendix VI) (Hops, 
Fleishman, Guild, Paine, Street, Walker, & Greenwood, 1978) is a teacher 
rating scale specifically designed to assess social withdrawal. The 
behaviour rating scale is an 8-item scale developed as part of a programme 
for withdrawn children (Hops et al., 1978). Teachers are asked to rate on a 
7-point scale how "true" or "descriptive" each item is to a child's 
behaviour. Hops, et al. (1978) found that this scale successfully 
discriminated between children referred for social withdrawal and their 
other classmates. The Social Interaction Scale (SIRS) provided additional 
behavioural evidence of the differences that may exist between socially 
anxious and non-socially anxious children in the present study. 
4. Self-report Ratings 
Performance Questionnaire 
Each child that participated in the current study was asked to 
complete a mathematics test and a short impromptu speech about any self-
selected topic. A brief performance questionnaire was used to assess each 
child's expectations and evaluations before and after each test situation. 
The performance measure was adopted from the Children's Cognitive 
Assessment Questionnaire (CCAQ-R, see Appendix VII) (Zatz & Chassin, 
1983) using only the positive and negative evaluation and expectation 
items. The scale included 12 items, half of which assess positive 
expectations and half assess negative expectations. Participants were 
instructed to rate on a 4-point scale their expectations of their performance 
both before and after the mathematics test and the speech. Scores were 
obtained by summing subject ratings separately, for both the positive 
expectations and the negative expectations. Use of this performance 
questionnaire enabled the current study to determine any differences 
between socially anxious children and non-socially anxious children in 
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expectations and self-evaluations for performance on both of the 
mathematics test and impromptu speech. 
In general, use of this test battery permited the study of cognitive 
information-processing operations of socially anxious children and to 
identify any possible differences that may exist between the socially 
anxious children and non-socially anxious children. It also allowed the 
present study to draw inferences regarding the self-perception and self-
concept of socially anxious children in social situations. 
Procedures 
All of the testing was conducted at the children's school. The initial 
screening procedure (lasting approximately 50 minutes) involved 
administering the modified Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (Turner, 
Dancu, & Beidel, 1984) to those children whose parents had previously 
provided written consent. The questionnaire was explained in a manner 
the children would have little difficulty completing it. Additionally, a 
page of definitions (see Appendix II) was provided which included words 
from the questionnaire and their meanings to clarify any ambiguities. The 
children were informed that they should answer honestly and that there 
were no right or wrong answers. They were also told that their answers 
were confidential. 
The second stage of the testing (lasting approximately 90 minutes), 
which commenced at least one week later, was completed in small groups. 
Participant scores on the SP AI were used as the criterion for assignment of 
children to either socially anxious or non-socially anxious groups. The 
children were asked to perform two cognitive tasks to determine if their 
expectations about their performance corresponded to their actual level of 
social skill. These tasks consisted of a mathematics test and an impromptu 
speech. The mathematics test comprised 12 questions. The test questions 
corresponded to the level of difficulty appropriate to the children's 
academic level. Prior to beginning, the participants were told that their 
score would be compared with those of the other children participating in 
the study therefore, it was important that they work alone. As a group, the 
children were given 15 minutes to complete as much of the test as 
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possible. The children were also asked to make an impromptu speech 
upon any self-selected topic with the experimenter and sample children 
serving as the audience. Prior to the beginning, the participants were 
given a 3-minute period in which to determine a topic for presentation 
and were also told that their speech would be compared with those of the 
other children. Each child then delivered a 2-minute impromptu speech. 
Before and after each task, the children completed a performance 
questionnaire to assess their expectations and evaluations for each test. 
Following the mathematics test and the impromptu speech the children 
were also asked to complete the self-report measures previously described. 
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Results 
1. General Description of Data 
Of the 127 children who participated in this study, 28 (22% of the 
total sample originally assessed) met criteria for a diagnosis of social 
anxiety, a prevalence figure which is similar with data on social anxiety 
from other sample populations (Beidel, Turner, Stanley, & Dancu, 1989). 
Twenty-three children of the sample served as the non-socially anxious 
group, based upon their lower than 30 SP AI cutoff score. Analysis of 
variance comparing socially anxious and non-socially anxious children 
revealed that there was a significant age difference between the two 
groups, E(l, 51) = 4.32, :J2 < .05. The analysis showed the children having 
high social anxiety scores are younger than their non-socially anxious 
counterparts. The mean age for the socially anxious group was 9.7 years, 
compared with the non-socially anxious group who averaged 10.0 years of 
age. There were no significant gender differences found between the 
socially anxious children and the non-socially anxious children (}2 > .05). 
Generally, the socially anxious group consisted of equal proportions of 
both boys and girls, whereas the non-socially anxious group had slightly 
more boys (57%) than girls (43%) but was not enough to be significant. 
TABLE 1 
SCORES OF SOCIALLY-ANXIOUS AND NON-SOCIALLY-ANXIOUS CHILDREN 
ON THE SPAI 
SOCIAL PHOBIA SUBSCALE, AGORAPHOBIA SUBSCALE AND TOTAL SCORE 
Socially-Anxious Non-Socially-Anxious 
Males Females Total Males Females Total 

























Table 1 presents the mean scores for both the socially anxious 
children and the non-socially anxious children on the two subscales and 
the total SPAI screening inventory. Scores on each of the social phobia 
sub scale, agoraphobia sub scale, as well as the SP AI total scores were 
analysed using one-way analyses of variance. On the social phobia 
subscale there was a main effect for group, E.(1, 50) = 186.43, 12 < .0001. 
Socially anxious participants scored significantly higher than children who 
do not experience social anxiety. There were no significant differences 
found between the socially anxious children and the non-socially anxious 
children on the agoraphobia subscale, (12 > .05). Finally, the results of the 
analysis for the SP AI total score revealed a significant main effect for 
group, E.(l, 50) = 608.17 l2 < .0001. That is, socially anxious children scored 
significantly higher on the SPAI than their non-socially anxious 
counterparts. Preliminary analysis also showed no significant gender 
differences. 
2. Means and Standard Deviations for all Variables 
Table 2 displays the group means and standard deviations of each of 
the measures used in this study. Each of these data sets were analysed 
with a two-way analyses of variance. The results of these analyses are also 
presented in Table 2. These analyses revealed significant differences 
between the socially anxious and non-socially anxious groups on the 
CNCEQ, SISST, CASQ, and the SPAI, with socially anxious children 
scoring considerably higher on the CNCEQ, SISST, and SP Al, and lower on 
the CASQ measure. Moreover, socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
children differed significantly on the total scale of the CNCEQ. Table 2 
shows that socially anxious children endorsed more negative distortions 
in thinking in response to ambiguous or negative events than non-
socially anxious children. In general, the socially anxious group had 
higher mean scores for all subscales of the CNCEQ. Analysis of variance 
revealed the two groups significantly differed in the type of error, 
especially personalization, E(l, 50) = 8.55, l2 < .005 and selective abstraction, 
F(l, 50) = 6.49, 12 < .01 and also the content area, notably academic 
5 1 
competence, E(l, 50) = 7.03, l2- < .01 and athletic competence, E(l, 50) = 5,17, 
l2- < .03. 
TABLE2 
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR SOCIALLY ANXIOUS AND NON-
SOCIALLY ANXIOUS CHILDREN ON COGNITIVE MEASURES OF SELF-REPORT 
Socially Anxious Non-Socially Anxious 
(n = 28) (n = 23) 
Measure Mean SD Mean SD E g 
CNCEO 
Catast 17.11 4.53 15.09 6.56 1.681 ns 
Over 16.18 4.56 14.36 5.78 1.755 ns 
Pers 18.79 4.71 14.35 6.13 8.546 .0052 
SA 17.21 3.79 13.96 5.33 6.491 .014 
Social 23.46 5.38 20.52 8.17 2.380 ns 
Academic 23.11 5.74 18.57 6.49 7.027 .0108 
Athletic 22.71 5.67 18.57 7.72 5.167 .0253 
TOTAL 69.29 14.68 57.65 21.23 5.323 .0253 
SISST 
Positive 43.04 7.34 44.74 10.84 .444 ns 
Negative 48.32 9.41 34.74 9.19 26.867 .0001 
CASO 
I+ 2.32 .98 2.22 1.09 .129 ns 
S+ 1.89 1.13 2.48 1.28 3.011 ns 
G+ 1.89 .99 2.52 .90 5.509 .023 
CP 6.11 2.30 7.22 1.83 3.521 ns 
I- 1.00 .82 1.09 .95 .124 ns 
S- 1.96 .92 1.17 .89 9.599 .0032 
G- 1.36 1.16 1.00 .80 1.565 ns 
CN 4.32 1.89 3.26 1.32 5.173 .0274 
COMP 1.79 3.33 3.96 2.50 6.693 .0127 
SIRS 34.61 8.18 38.61 11.25 2.159 ns 
SPAI 
SPsubsc 103.76 13.58 38.55 20.37 186.430 .0001 
AGsubsc 23.57 10.78 22.87 18.85 .028 ns 
Total 80.17 5.89 15.86 12.20 608.167 .0001 
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Comparison of mean scores on the SISST revealed socially anxious 
children had significantly more negative self-statements than their non-
socially anxious counterparts. There were no significant differences 
between the two groups in terms of positive self-thoughts experienced in 
specific situations. In addition, scores on the CASQ showed socially 
anxious participants displayed an attributional style similar to that 
demonstrated by depressed individuals, with an overall negative 
attribution style for explaining events. Finally, there were no significant 
results demonstrated by the SIRS. 
3. Social Anxiety and Cognitive Information-Processing: 
Negative Cognitive Errors 
Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire 
Beck's (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) cognitive theory implies 
that faulty cognitive thinking, especially negatively biased thinking styles 
play a key role in the development and maintenance of anxiety. 
Furthermore, it is assumed that these individuals make cognitive errors, 
collectively known as distortions in response to ambiguous or unfamiliar 
circumstances. As a consequence, they have negatively-biased and self-
defeating patterns of interpreting events. 
Table 2 shows children with high social anxiety endorsed more 
negative cognitive errors than children who were not socially anxious. 
Analysis of variance showed significant differences were found between 
the socially anxious group and the non-socially anxious group on the 
CNCEQ, E(l, 50) = 5.32, l2 < .03. Analysis also revealed significantly higher 
scores for the socially anxious group with regard to the type of negative 
cognitive error. High socially anxious children engaged in significantly 
more personalizing and selective abstraction than non-socially anxious 
children, E(l, 50) = 8.55, l2 < .005, and E(l, 50) = 6.49, l2 < .01, respectively. 
The two groups also differed in terms of the quantity of distortions 
in specific content areas. Analysis revealed socially anxious children 
engage in significantly more cognitive distortions in both the academic, 
E(l, 50) = 7.03, l2 < .01, and athletic, E(l, SO) = 5,17, p. < .03, content areas. 
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4. Social Anxiety and Cognition 
Of primary interest here were the relations between social anxiety 
and cognition. Separate one-factor analyses of variance were calculated for 
each cognitive measure. This series of analyses revealed significant results 
between socially anxious children and non-socially anxious children on 
the cognitive self-report instruments. 
Social Interaction Self-Statement Test 
It was predicted that socially anxious children would experience a 
higher proportion of negative self-statements about themselves and their 
performance compared with non-socially anxious children. That is, in 
contrast to non-socially anxious children, socially anxious children will 
report more negative self-statements than positive self-statements 
regarding themselves and their performance. 
The means and standard deviations for the SISST-N are presented 
in Table 2. A one-way ANOV A showed a significant difference between 
the two groups on the negative subscale of the SISST, E(l, 50) = 26.87, l2 < 
0001. As expected, the socially anxious children reported significantly 
higher scores than the non-socially anxious children on the negative 
subscale of the SISST. That is, children who are highly socially anxious 
experience a higher proportion of negative self-statements or self-thoughts 
about themselves and their performance than non-socially anxious 
children. All other results were non-significant. 
Performance Questionnaire: Assessment of Cognitions during the 
Behavioural Tasks 
Scores from the performance questionnaires were analysed using 
two-factor (Social Anxiety and Time of Testing) repeated-measures 
analysis of variance. It was expected that socially anxious children would 
underestimate positive aspects of their behaviour and overestimate 
negative aspects of their behaviour. That is, they will report significantly 
more negative evaluations of social performance and fewer positive 
evaluations than low socially anxious children. Thoughts were 
categorised as positive and negative evaluations or expectations in terms 
of their relationship to the specific task. Results demonstrated a 
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significant difference in positive and negative evaluations, before and 
after both the mathematics test and the impromptu speech. 
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FIGURE 2. POSITIVE EVALUATIONS OF PERFORMANCE ON THE 






















SOCIAL ANXIETY STATUS 
• PRE-TEST 
0 POST-TEST 
FIGURE 3. NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS OF PERFORMANCE ON THE 
MATHEMATICS TEST BY SOCIALLY ANXIOUS AND NON-SOCIALLY ANXIOUS 
CHILDREN. 
The mean scores of the high- and low-socially anxious children on 
the positive and negative subscales of the performance evaluation 
measure for the mathematics test are presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
Analysis of these data demonstrates a significant main effect for social 
anxiety with socially anxious children having significantly fewer positive 
evaluations of their performance, E(l, 49) = 18.72, 12- < .0001. Results also 
showed evidence of a significant Social Anxiety and Time of Testing 
interaction for positive evaluation of the mathematics test, E.(1, 49) = 4.12, 
l2- < .05. After the mathematics test was completed, the positive 
evaluations made by socially anxious children regarding their 
performance declined from pre-test to post-test, whereas positive 
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evaluations made by non-socially anxious children increased even further 
from pre-test to post-test, after they had performed the mathematics test. 
Moreover, socially anxious children made significantly more 
negative evaluations of their performance on the mathematic test, E(l 49) 
= 19.03, l2 < .0001. A significant Social Anxiety and Time of Testing 
interaction was also found for negative evaluations of the mathematics 
test, F(l, 49) = 5.45, l2 < .02. After the mathematic test was completed, 
negative evaluations made by socially anxious children concerning their 
performance escalated from Time 1 to Time 2, whereas negative 
evaluations made by non-socially anxious children dramatically decreased 
even more after they had finished the task. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that socially anxious children systematically underestimate 
positive aspects of the behaviour and overestimate negative aspects of 
their performance. 
Differences in ability 
Mathematical ability varied between the six schools with mean 
scores ranging from 7.14 to 2.63. Analysis of variance demonstrated a 
significant difference in mathematical ability between the six primary 
schools, E(5, 50) = 4.64, l2 < .002. However, analysis revealed there were no 
significant differences in ability between socially anxious and non-socially 
anxious children for the mathematics test (J2 > .05). There were also no 
significant differences in ability between boys and girls, or significant age 
differences. 
Impromptu speech - performance evaluations 
Two-factor (Social Anxiety and Time of Testing) repeated-measures 
analysis of variance showed a significant difference between the 
evaluations made by socially anxious and non-socially anxious children 
regarding the impromptu speech. The mean scores of the negative 
performance evaluations for socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
children are displayed in Figure 4. Socially anxious children gave 
significantly more negative evaluations of themselves and their 
performance than non-socially anxious children, E(l, 49) = 35.38, l2 < .0001. 
Furthermore, a significant Social Anxiety and Time of Testing interaction 
for the impromptu speech was found, E(l, 49) = 5.24, l2 < .03. Negative 
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evaluations made by socially anxious children increased even further after 
they gave a speech compared with the negative evaluations made by non-
























SOCIAL ANXIETY STATUS 
FIGURE 4. NEGATIVE EVALUATIONS OF PERFORMANCE ON THE IMPROMPTU 
SPEECH BY SOCIALLY ANXIOUS AND NON-SOCIALLY ANXIOUS CHILDREN 
Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire 
The present study hypothesized that socially anxious children 
would report pathological patterns of attribution regarding the causes of 
events, compared with children who are not socially anxious. More 
specifically, they would report more internal, stable, and global 
attributions for negative events and more external, unstable, and specific 
attributions for positive events. 
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Participants in both groups were examined for their dominant 
attributional preferences. Socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
children differed significantly on the CASQ. Analysis of variance 
comparing the socially anxious and non-socially anxious groups revealed 
significant differences on the total CASQ attribution scale, E(l, 50) = 6.69, 
12. < .01. Socially anxious children adopt a much more depressive 
explanatory style for events compared with non-socially anxious children. 
Subsequent analysis also showed significant inconsistencies between the 
two groups on both of the CASQ composite subscales. Group differences 
were significant for the negative composite scale, E(l, 50) = 5.14, J2 < .03. 
The most appropriate interpretation of the anxiety main effects is that the 
non-socially anxious group made more global attributions for positive 
outcomes of situations than the socially anxious group, E(l, 50) = 5.51, 
J2 < .02. In addition, children who were highly socially anxious made 
significantly more stable attributions for negative consequences of 
situations, E(l, 50) = 9.60, l2 < .003. 
5. School Effects 
A series of two-factor (School and Social Anxiety) ANOV As 
demonstrated statistically significant interactions between social anxiety 
and primary school for some of the error types, content areas and total 
distortion scale of the CNCEQ. A significant interaction was found 
between Primary School and Social Anxiety for the total distortion score of 
the CNCEQ, F(5, 39) = 3.49, J2 < .01. Levels of social anxiety and the 
different schools interacted in causing negative cognitive errors. 
Error analysis of the data also demonstrated a significant Social 
Anxiety and Primary School interaction. Analysis revealed an interaction 
effect for catastrophizing, E.(5, 39) = 4.56, l2 < .002. Results also revealed a 
significant Social Anxiety and School interaction for overgeneralizing, E.(5, 
39) = 3.46, l2 < .01. 
A significant Primary School and Social Anxiety interaction was 
found for two of the three content areas of the CNCEQ. The present 
analysis revealed a significant interaction for the social competence area, 
F(5, 39) = 3.14, J2 < .02. There was also a School and Social Anxiety 
interaction for the academic competence area, E.(5, 39) = 3.14, l2 < .02. 
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Discussion 
In accordance with cognitive theory, children who experienced 
specific symptoms of anxiety associated with social situations scored 
significantly higher on the total Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory than 
children who did not experience feelings of anxiety anticipating, or during 
social interactions. This result is similar to those of previous studies 
(Beidel, Turner, & Dancu, 1985). Higher scores on the Social Phobia and 
Anxiety Inventory reflect the threat-related content of the dominance 
schemata associated with the fear of negative evaluation and scrutiny of 
the social self in social situations. The fundamental difference between 
socially anxious and non-socially anxious children was in terms of the 
frequency and intensity of social anxiety symptoms, how these symptoms 
are interpreted cognitively, and also one's perceived control over anxiety. 
The details of these differences in self-perceptions will become clear later 
on as the current study examines cognitive information-processing, 
attentional bias, expectancies, attributions, self-evaluations, memories, 
and so on. 
Childrens' perception of themselves and their environment is 
more important in understanding his or her development than his· or her 
actual behaviour. Of great interest to the present study was the self-
perceptions socially anxious children have about themselves and their 
performance on two tasks of cognitive abilities. According to Beck's (Beck, 
Emery, & Greenberg, 1985) theory of anxiety, their reportable cognitions, 
thoughts, and ideas regarding themselves and their performance, are the 
consequences of cognitive processes, an information-processing operation. 
Cognitive Information-Processing 
Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire (CNCEQ) 
In accordance with Beck, Emery, and Greenberg's (1985) theory of 
anxiety, socially anxious children were expected to make systematic biases 
in information processing known as negative cognitive errors or 
distortions in response to ambiguous or negative circumstances. Beck's 
(1985) theory has received limited attention with regard to evaluation-
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anxious children (Leitenberg, Yost, & Carroll-Wilson, 1986). The present 
study revealed that socially anxious children endorsed more negative 
cognitive errors more strongly than did their non-socially anxious 
counterparts. This is consistent with results from other studies 
(Leitenberg, Yost, & Carroll-Wilson, 1986). According to Beck's theory, one 
may surmise that the dominance schemata of socially anxious children are 
characterised by their hypervalent threat or vulnerability content. The 
activity of these modes is reflected in the typical thinking disorder 
characteristic of socially anxious children. As a result of the biased 
selection and processing of information, the socially anxious child makes 
errors or selective distortions such as misinterpretation, 
overgeneralization, and exaggeration from the time of perception to recall. 
These bias and distortions may be the consequences of, and help to 
confirm and strengthen maladaptive schemas while repressing more 
adaptive schemas that are inconsistent with these distortions. In social 
anxiety, the schemata used for processing threat to oneself such as 
negative evaluation, rejection, humiliation, criticism and so on are 
vigilant whereas schemata relevant to 'safe' information are inactive. 
There are a number of differences in the way socially anxious and 
non-socially anxious individuals interpret information and several of 
these are thought to result from different types of cognitive processing. It 
should be emphasized that stronger endorsement of each type of cognitive 
error was unique to children who scored on the high end of the Social 
Phobia and Anxiety Inventory. Socially anxious children as a group, 
engaged in significantly more personalizing and selective abstraction in 
both the academic and athletic context areas than children who were not 
socially anxious. In support of Beck's theory, not only did socially anxious 
children display an attentional bias by selectively attending to the negative 
aspects of their experiences, but they also took more personal 
responsibility for the negative consequences of events than their non-
socially anxious peers. Selectively attending to, and/ or emphasizing past 
or anticipated failures will contribute to a cognitive process that maintains 
this negative, self-defeating cycle. Therefore, in light of these systematic 
differences, it seems fair to conclude that high socially anxious children 
are more likely to indulge in the negative cognitive errors described by 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, and Emery (1979) than their non-socially anxious peers. 
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Can one conclude that this provides a foundation for speculating 
that socially anxious children have a unique faulty logical thinking 
process? An important feature of the processing of information by socially 
anxious individuals is the lack of perspective related to this automatic 
processing. The thoughts and perceptions sterning from automatic 
cognitive processing are usually accepted as reflecting reality by the socially 
anxious individual. These exaggerated perceptions of internal and 
external threat are not doubted by the socially anxious person. Ingram and 
Kendall (1988) recognize that some degree of automatic processing is an 
essential ingredient of proficient functioning. They also conclude that a 
distinguishing characteristic of the processing of information by anxious 
and non-anxious individuals is the ability to engage in metacognition in 
the necessary circumstances. That is, although non-anxious persons also 
at times accept the negative automatic thoughts and perceptions that may 
occur in particular situations, unlike anxious persons, non-anxious 
individuals have the necessary means and adaptability to consider the 
accuracy or inaccuracy of their cognitions. 
It may also be possible that non-socially anxious children distort 
more, if not more so, than socially anxious children in a positive or self-
enhancing manner instead of the predominantly negative or self-
deprectory way characteristic of socially anxious persons (Leitenberg, Yost, 
& Carroll-Wilson, 1986). Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-Wilson (1986) 
suggest that both the socially anxious group and the non-socially anxious 
group may make similar errors in their judgement, but in opposite 
directions. More precisely, non-socially anxious children may be 
susceptible or predisposed to distort information in a positive manner, or 
to "look through rose-coloured glasses" (Leitenberg, Yost, and Carroll-
Wilson, 1986, p. 534), whereas socially anxious children seem to distort 
information in a negatively biased direction. Some support has been 
found for this theory with depressed adults who do have an overly 
negative view of events but also a more realistic view than a comparison 
group of normal participants (Strack & Coyne, 1983). The social 
psychological literature has also emphasized that most children and adults 
perceive themselves in a personally biased or self-enhancing manner e.g., 
the hypothesized 'self-serving bias' (Myers, 1990). 
Consistent with Beck's theory, this suggests that socially anxious 
children show an attentional shift towards threat-related stimuli in social 
62 
situations. These results demonstrate that socially anxious children will 
automatically and selectively attend to threatening stimuli in their social 
environment. In support of Beck's theory, socially anxious individuals 
show a hypervigilance for threat and danger cues within their social 
environment. Furthermore, studies on self-efficacy (Bandura, Adams, & 
Beyer, 1977) have shown that when confronted with a feared situation, 
anxious individuals report a heightened sense of vulnerability and 
underestimate their ability to cope with the situation. 
School Effects: 
The present study also found a significant interaction for School 
and Social Anxiety for the Children's Negative Cognitive Error 
Questionnaire. The basis of this interaction was that there was a greater 
difference between the high-socially anxious children and low socially 
anxious children from schools in the higher socio-economic school 
districts. In contrast, there were few differences between the high socially 
anxious and low socially anxious children attending school in the lower 
socioeconomic districts. Thus, the differences observed between the 
schools on the Children's Negative Cognitive Error Questionnaire scale 
seem to vary as a function of the childrens' socioeconomic status. This 
supports Beck et al.'s (1985) contention that anxious individuals' 
perceptions are influenced by the environment. It may have been the case 
that children from high socioeconomic backgrounds are quite practiced at 
social comparisons in order to determine their social position. Children 
from the lower socioeconomic backgrounds may have stopped making 
such a through social comparison because their past efforts may have led 
them to the permanent conclusion that their efforts are substandard. 
Socially anxious children are locked into a constant search for social 
cues such as certain facial expressions that indicate hostile appraisals of his 
or her self-presentation behaviour. They will interpret any signs of 
negative evaluation, mistakes, or weaknesses in the worst possible way 
which serves to aggravate the problem. Furthermore, even when they are 
performing well in social situations, they nevertheless anticipate that they 
will look stupid and be criticised or negatively evaluated by others. Such 
catastrophic predictions exacerbate inhibitions and lead to tentativeness, 
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ineptness, or withdrawal. This self-focus interferes with one's behaviour 
and increases one's sense of vulnerability. 
For both children and adults, the social and academic areas of life 
are highly evaluative. Not all situations however, are evaluative in the 
same sense. The social and academic self-concept of an individual is based 
on his or her history of evaluative feedback and one's self-related 
cognitions in each learning environment. Consequently, the focus is on 
one's competence in relation to others. When the socially anxious child 
from low socioeconomic background catastrophizes and overgeneralizes 
negative events, he or she may rely on immediate feedback from the social 
environment, expectations about events based on prior experiences and 
outcomes, and the anxious child's misperceptions of future dire 
consequences. Even prominent successes, or positive feedback in the past 
do not have a permanent effect because the vulnerable child believes that 
he or she will always fail in future situations and the consequences of such 
failure will be much more drastic and humiliating than any success could 
be (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). Research consistently demonstrates 
that socially anxious individuals have a selective memory for negative 
interpersonal feedback (O'Banion & Arkowitz, 1977), and are overly 
sensitive to such feedback (Smith & Sarason, 1975). Socially anxious 
individuals from the higher socioeconomic classes may actively resist 
information that would disconfirm their negative self-images by 
selectively focusing on negative feedback, doubting the accuracy of 
positive feedback, and by attributing success to external factors. 
As a consequence, formal thinking processes are impaired and the 
socially anxious child from lower socioeconomic classes may find it 
difficult to be objective about his or her negative self-appraisals. Given 
this, their self-attributions and self-evaluations will often be for failure. 
At the global level, these childrens' self-confidence is diminished and 
their personal sense of self-efficacy (expectation of success) is reduced. 
An alternative explanation for the School and Social Anxiety 
interaction may be that the differences between the socially anxious 
children and non-socially anxious children on the Children's Negative 
Cognitive Error Questionnaire may be a function of the differences 
between the schools. Levels of social anxiety and the different schools may 
have interacted in causing children to catastrophize and overgeneralize 
about possible negative evaluation or criticism. It may be that the effect of 
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social anxiety on these negative cognitive errors varied as a function of the 
differences between the schools. For example, the social and academic 
environment varies between schools and the feedback and attitudes of 
one's teachers and competition from one's peers may have a direct effect 
on a child's self-concept and the likelihood of developing anxiety reactions 
in these situations. 
The socioeconomic circumstances of the various schools may have 
an effect on the way in which socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
children evaluate future outcomes. The psychological problems of lower-
class children have been suggested to be externalizing (delinquency), 
whereas the psychological problems of middle- to high-class children are 
often internalizing (anxiety disorders) (Santrock & Yussen, 1987). It has 
been proposed that on average socially anxious individuals belong to a 
higher social class and generally have a better education (Amies, Gelder, & 
Shaw, 1983; Solyom, Ledwidge, & Solyom, 1986). A study by Amies 
Gelder, & Shaw (1983) revealed that 33% of the socially anxious 
participants were from a higher social class than their parents, which may 
suggest that social anxiety may be partly the result of uncertainties related 
to social behaviour in 'higher' social classes. One can only speculate as to 
the effects, if any, socioeconomic circumstances have on the present 
study's results because the current study did not employ an objective 
measure of socioeconomic status. Socioeconomic circumstances needs to 
be taken into account in future research in this area. 
Buss (1980) postulated that social anxiety or shyness results from 
experiences in childhood or adolescence that foster excessive social-
evaluative concerns. This hypersensitivity to social-evaluative stimuli 
may be due to differences in childrearing practices between socioeconomic 
classes. Parenting practices that convey rejection to a child may instil a 
preoccupation with others' evaluative remarks and furthermore, a 
generalised fear of negative evaluation. Also a parenting practice that may 
foster fear of negative evaluation by placing excessive importance on 
proper grooming, dress, manners and so on may stem from a parent's 
concern about the opinion of others (e.g., relatives, neighbours, strangers) 
regarding appropriate behaviour of their children. That is, if parents 
repeatedly remind their children of how others are evaluating them, Buss 
contends that these admonitions may contribute to the development of 
social anxiety because the child seeks to avoid the attention and 
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evaluation of others. Other factors may include the degree to which 
parents encourage their child to be sociable. 
The findings discussed to this point lend support to several aspects 
of Beck et al.'s (1985) model of anxiety. The model hypothesizes a link 
between social anxiety and biases or distortions in cognitive information-
processing operations in socially anxious individuals. As a result of such 
distortions in information-processing, socially anxious individuals make 
self-defeating and distorted cognitions regarding themselves and others 
observation and evaluation of them in social situations. 
Automatic Thoughts and Cognitions 
Self-focused attention interrupts the actions of socially anxious 
individuals in social situations and provokes a subjective outcome 
assessment. This state of self-awareness in social situations leads non-
socially anxious individuals to favourable and socially anxious 
individuals to unfavourable outcome expectancies. As a result non-
socially anxious individuals will focus more effort on their performance, 
show more persistence, and obtain success while socially anxious persons 
will withdraw from the situation and be preoccupied with self-deprecatory 
ruminations. As a result they will probably experience failure (as they 
perceive it to be) in social situations. Beck and Clark (1988) contend that 
the socially anxious persons self-verbalizations, internal dialogue, and 
inhibitions reflect the content of their maladaptive schemata. 
Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST) 
The thoughts of socially anxious individuals are dominated by 
statements and questions that appear in an automatic fashion. For 
example, Hartman (1983) has pointed out that socially anxious individuals 
become preoccupied with metacognition. That is, they engage in thoughts 
regarding their physiological arousal, others' perceptions of them as 
socially inadequate, inappropriately nervous, or psychologically inept. 
This excessive self-focus causes the socially anxious person to 
overestimate the degree to which other will notice their somatic 
symptoms, and underestimate their level of social skills and ability to 
accurately judge how others evaluate them. The assessment of cognitions 
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of fearful or anxious children has been relatively neglected by researchers 
and clinicians (Francis, 1988). This is unusual given the highly cognitive 
nature of certain phobias and anxiety disorders, particularly social anxiety 
of children and adolescents. 
Socially anxious children are characterised by excessive self-focused 
attention in social situations (Smith, Ingram, & Brehm, 1983). It has been 
shown that socially anxious adults endorse a high frequency of negative 
self-statements (Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982). Consistent with 
the cognitive model, socially anxious children reported more negative 
self-statements than non-socially anxious children. Of particular interest 
is the failure of positive or coping self-statements to correlate above the 
cut-off level of the SPAI. An explanation for this may be that the socially 
anxious participants in this sample differ from non-socially anxious 
children only with respect to the frequency of negative or inhibitory 
cognitions. Hartman (1983) suggested that intense social anxiety involves 
a comparable level of positive cognitions or thoughts as does low social 
anxiety. However, socially anxious children experience significantly more 
negative or inhibitory self-statements specific to social interactions, 
including self-deprecating attributions, fear of being negatively evaluated, 
negative self-evaluations, thoughts of incompetence, and so on. The 
distinction between socially anxious and non-socially anxious children 
may exist in their ability to interrupt such debilitating self-statements in 
social situations. 
Schwartz and Garamoni (1986, cited in Kendall and Ingram, 1987) 
described a 'negative dialogue' as existing in dysfunctional psychological 
states. When functioning becomes impaired, two-thirds of cognitive 
thought contains negative statements and only one-third is dominated by 
positive thought. During states of severely impaired functioning negative 
cognitions exceed this two-thirds level and positive cognitions exist at a 
correspondingly low level. Stefanek, Ollendick, Baldock, Francis, and 
Yaeger (1987) examined children's inhibiting and facilitating self-
statements in response to role-play situations in which the child was in 
conflict with, or had to initiate an interaction with a peer. Socially 
withdrawn children endorsed significantly more debilitating self-
statements and fewer positive self-statements than their well-adjusted 
peers. 
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The present study found no significant difference in the frequency 
of positive self-statements across the two social anxiety groups. This is 
consistent with findings from other studies involving socially anxious 
adult participants (Stopa & Clark, 1993). One may speculate that particular 
types of positive self-statements may have been used more frequently by 
lower anxious participants. For example, non-socially anxious children 
may have used self-statements which minimized the importance of 
negative reactions and evaluations from others. Another possible reason 
for a nonsignificant relationship between social anxiety and positive self-
statements found in the present study, might be lack of power due to the 
size of the sample used. It may also be possible that the Social Interaction 
Self-Statement Test is a measure of adult thoughts and although modified, 
these self-statements may not have been specific to the thoughts of 
children. 
It appears that the thoughts, perceptions, and expectancies that are 
typical of socially anxious children make one aware of how they tend to 
approach social situations with maladaptive and conflicted cognitive 
processing of self-relevant social information. Hartman (1983) suggested 
that socially anxious individuals suffer from a 'selective attention deficit' 
which impairs their ability to participate effectively in social situations. 
That is, their excessive self-consciousness interferes with the attention that 
should be paid to other people and the social situation. Cheek and 
Melchior (1990) supported this theory by demonstrating that shy college 
women reported spending 33% of a 5-minute social interaction engaged in 
self-focus compared to non-shy individuals who reported spending 
approximately 20% of the time in self-focus. Furthermore, the content of 
the self-preoccupation of socially anxious women involved negative 
thoughts about making a poor impression and the possibility of negative 
evaluation. 
Non-socially anxious person's self-perceptions are not dominated 
by a sense of incompetence however, the socially anxious individual is 
systematically thinking about and questioning his or her ability to perform 
or rather, his or her sense of incompetence. Each "what if" question 
carries the theme of an inability to handle or cope with the forthcoming 
situation causing the socially anxious individual to feel vulnerable. Thus, 
self-statement patterns bear some resemblance to a careful and reflective 
process of evaluation of one's self-worth. The socially anxious 
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individual's internal dialogue serves to maintain the uncertainty in any 
given social interaction and hence its anxiety-arousing qualities. 
Expectations and Evaluations of Performance 
Schwarzer (1986) suggested that self-focused attention gives way to a 
cognitive process where one's own coping ability is under scrutiny. 
Highly socially anxious individuals are self-centered and focused on self-
evaluation and self-worry rather than on the situation task. The current 
findings demonstrated predicted differences in self-evaluative cognitions 
between socially anxious and non-socially anxious children. High socially 
anxious children reported more negative evaluative cognitions for both 
the mathematics test and the impromptu speech. These cognitions 
included unfavourable social comparisons, feelings of intense anxiety, and 
negative evaluations of one's competence. Furthermore, socially anxious 
and non-socially anxious children differed with respect to the frequency of 
positive evaluations, with non-socially anxious children reporting more 
thoughts of competence, mastery, and lower levels of anxiety than socially 
anxious children. In these respects, the cognitions of socially anxious 
children are similar to those of socially anxious adults (e.g., Beidel, Turner, 
& Dancu, 1985; Clark & Arkowitz, 1975; Stopa & Clark, 1993). 
Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985) have suggested that the negative 
thoughts of socially anxious individuals actually bring about some of the 
feared impairments of performance. Findings from the current study 
showed that there were no significant differences in performance between 
socially anxious and non-socially anxious children on the mathematics 
test. There are three alternative interpretations of this finding. Firstly, the 
nonsignificant results may be a function of the nature of the study. More 
specifically, the sample was composed of a normal school population and 
the mathematics test procedure may have only elicited small amounts of 
anxiety. It may be possible that anxiety levels were too low to severely 
impair performance. Replication of the study with a socially anxious 
clinical population under naturalistic conditions would be beneficial in 
determining the extent of the relationship between social anxiety (as 
measured by the SP AI), and academic performance in children. Secondly, 
differences in mathematical ability between the various schools may have 
confounded the results of the mathematic test. And finally, this 
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discrepancy in self-efficacy may be a consequence of differences in 
perceptions of ability, not necessarily skill deficits. 
A number of studies involving clinically severe socially anxious 
participants have suggested that social skills deficits are of less importance 
in the maintenance of social anxiety than once thought (Edelmann, 1985; 
Newton, Kindness, & McFadyen, 1983). Socially anxious persons 
experience anxiety in social situations because they believe they are 
socially incompetent, not necessarily because they lack the appropriate 
social skills in their behaviour repertoire. Halford and Foddy (1982) 
judged the skills deficit model as insufficient stating that a satisfactory 
social skill repertoire may be necessary, but not sufficient to master social 
difficulties. For example, a study by Curran, Wallander, and Fishetti (1977, 
cited in Halford & Foddy, 1982) examined heterosexual dating anxiety and 
found all socially unskilled participants were highly anxious in 
heterosexual interactions but not all highly skilled participants were low 
in anxiety. Halford and Foddy (1982) concluded that although social skills 
training can teach individuals to respond in a socially skilful way to 
difficult social interactions, these new behaviours do not always generalise 
to other social situations, suggesting simple skill deficits are not the only 
factor responsible for social anxiety. 
Differences in attentional focus have also been implicated as 
causing social incompetence of socially anxious individuals (Hartman, 
1983). Hartman postulated that socially anxious individual's performance 
in social situations is impaired as a result of their divided attention 
between external cues in the social situation and internal cues (self-
defeative thinking and perceptions of autonomic arousal). In those same 
situations non-anxious individuals concentrate on the interpersonal 
interaction only. Glass and Shea (1986) concluded from their own studies 
that for the majority of participants, it appears social anxiety is more of a 
self-confidence issue, involving highly negative self-evaluations and 
expectations. Hartman (1983) argued that people who are socially anxious 
have too little confidence in their own merits as a person. Furthermore, 
Hartman suggested that excessive self-focusing and low self-esteem are the 
essential ingredients for social anxiety. 
Yet there are those individuals who do show real deficits in social 
skills and seem to benefit from social skills training (Glass and Shea, 1986). 
As a consequence, the present study refutes the skills deficit hypothesis 
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and supports the cognitive hypothesis as socially anxious children in this 
sample, did not show signs of social skill deficits but rather, their 
perception or misperception of anticipated incompetence resulted in 
negative evaluations and crippling inhibitions. 
Zatz and Chassin (1983) take note that previous research has 
doubted the use of low anxious participants as a basis for comparing the 
performance of highly anxious participants. Some authors (Galassi, 
Frierson, & Sharer, 1981; Wittmaier, 1976) have claimed that participants 
with low anxiety may be 'maladaptive' and show impaired performance 
because of low motivation. They concluded that moderately anxious 
participants represent a better functioning and much more practical 
comparison group. Results from the present study fail to support this 
theory as high socially anxious and low socially anxious children did not 
significantly differ in terms of their performance on the mathematics test. 
According to these results, low socially anxious children represent an 
appropriate comparison group in spite of prior speculation regarding their 
low motivation. 
Interaction Effects 
In two different settings where evaluation by others could be a cause 
for concern, the socially anxious children consistently endorsed 
significantly more negative evaluatory cognitions and more severe 
subjective distress than their non-socially anxious peers. Significant Social 
Anxiety and Time of Testing interactions were found for negative and 
positive evaluations of the mathematics test, and for negative evaluations 
of the impromptu speech. In light of the mathematics test, positive 
expectations and evaluations made by socially anxious children prior to 
the test declined even further after they had performed the task. In 
contrast, the positive self-evaluations made by the non-socially anxious 
children escalated even more after they had completed the mathematics 
test. Moreover, the negative evaluations made by socially anxious 
children regarding their own performance before the mathematic test 
increased even more so after they had accomplished the test. With regard 
to the children's performance on the impromptu speech, socially anxious 
children gave significantly more negative evaluations after they had 
completed the task than they had prior to beginning the speech. This is 
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consistent with findings from other research that continues to 
demonstrate socially anxious individuals expect their social behaviour 
will be inadequate and that they will be negatively evaluated by others 
(DePaulo, Kenny, Webb, & Oliver, 1987; Leary, Kowalski & Campbell, 
1988). 
Bandura's (1982) self-efficacy theory has been applied to social 
anxiety as a result of the consistency of such findings. Self-efficacy is the 
confidence one has in one's ability to act successfully in specific situations 
(Bandura, 1982). The theory of self-efficacy reflects an individual's 
expectation that he or she can perform a particular task. According to this 
model, socially anxious children tend to have both low self-efficacy 
expectancies and low outcome expectancies (Maddux, Norton, & Leary, 
1988). That is, socially anxious children systematically doubted their ability 
going into the task and their perceptions of lack of ability, fear of failure, 
fear of negative evaluation, heightened vulnerability, and so on, have 
convinced them that they would not be as good as their peers. 
The pattern of results provide support for the major hypothesis that 
socially anxious participants systematically underestimate positive aspects 
of their performance and overestimate negative aspects more than non-
socially anxious participants. The predicted differences were significant for 
social anxiety and performance. High socially anxious participants 
attributed more social anxiety and less social skill and ability to their 
performance. There are several possibilities to account for the differences 
between the socially anxious and non-socially anxious groups in their self-
evaluations. One of these possibilities concerns the standards for self-
evaluation. The observed differences between the two groups may be due 
to the socially anxious children using more stringent standards for their 
own performance than did non-anxious children. To the extent that 
socially anxious children are using much more severe or stringent 
standards for self-evaluations, it follows that they would tend to be more 
negative regarding their own performance than say external observations 
of their performance. A study by Terbovic (1973) supports this proposal, 
however other studies have proved otherwise (e.g., Wallace & Alden, 
1991). Terbovic (1973), using an achievement task (anagram solving task) 
demonstrated that males with overly negative self-evaluations had 
significantly higher standards for achievement success than their 
counterparts with more positive self-evaluations. 
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A further possibility that may account for the differences in self-
evaluations found between the socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
children in the current study may derive from the possibility of selective 
attention and selective memory. This is particularly important with 
respect to positive versus negative information about oneself, especially 
one's social performance. For example Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss (1973) 
demonstrated that participants spent more time selectively attending to 
information concerning their personal assets after an episode of success 
than they did after a failure experience. Mischel, Ebbesen, and Zeiss 
performed a second unpublished experiment ( cited in Clark, & Arkowitz, 
1975) in which they found that participants accurately recalled more of 
their positive personal resources than their drawbacks when they expected 
to succeed than when they expected to fail on an ability test. 
Bearing in mind that socially anxious and non-socially anxious 
participants did not significantly differ in their social performance on the 
mathematics test and supposing that they used similar standards for 
successful performance, the differences observed in the self-evaluations 
may be a consequence of selective attention and/ or remembering of 
negative aspects of their performance on the part of socially anxious 
children. In contrast, non-socially anxious children would selectively 
attend to and remember more positive aspects of their performance (Clark 
& Arkowitz, 1975). Beck (1985) hypothesized that anxious individuals 
have greater access to negative memories of previous performance than to 
positive ones. Even significant successes in the past have no permanent 
effect because the 'vulnerable' individual always believes he or she will 
eventually fail and the consequences of such failure will be drastic and 
humiliating. Hence, the socially anxious child's selective recall may be a 
consequence of the 'vulnerability' mode (Beck & Emery, 1985). Generally 
speaking, the socially anxious individual is in a 'no win' situation with an 
image based either on perceived inadequate performances in the past or 
on a vision of how he or she will appear if they fail. 
By and large, the results of the current study like similar findings 
from other studies (Clark & Arkowitz, 1975) suggest both the socially 
anxious children and non-socially anxious children have the appropriate 
social skills for successful performance in their repertoire and their 
abilities are reflected in their overt social performance. The accompanying 
anxiety and avoidance that the socially anxious person experiences in 
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social situations may well be brought about by their excessive self-focused 
attention and self-evaluation. The potential role of self-evaluation may 
have a possible mediating effect on social anxiety regardless of the actual 
level of social skills and abilities. Even though inadequacies in social 
skills may be the primary factor in some cases, the present results lend 
support to social-evaluative processes which may also be just as 
important, if not more so. 
So far, the results of the present study provide evidence that socially 
anxious children under social-evaluative threat demonstrate increases in 
cognitive activity that reflects concern over evaluations of others. Socially 
anxious individuals resist information that would disconfirm their 
negative self-images by attributing success to external factors, selectively 
focusing on negative feedback, and doubting the accuracy of positive 
feedback. For example, socially anxious children tended to perceive their 
performance as deficient even when it was not. They think they are 
continually being observed by other people even when they are not and 
their self-standards of their performance are perfectionistic. In addition, 
they recall past negative encounters but forget or ignore past positive 
performances and accept negative feedback at the expense of positive 
feedback from others. They blame themselves for negative social 
consequences and do not take credit for positive outcomes. Thus the 
'cautious' or 'protective' self-presentational strategies adopted by socially 
anxious individuals make sense for a person who is preoccupied with 
worry and self-doubt. 
Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire(CASQ) 
Total scores on the measure assessing attributional style in the 
current study were related to social anxiety, consistent with cognitive 
theories of social anxiety. The socially anxious children showed 
attributional styles somewhat parallel to those often displayed by 
depressives. Children who scored higher on the Social Phobia and 
Anxiety Inventory displayed self-deprecating attributions on the 
Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire scale compared with 
participants who scored significantly lower on the Social Phobia and 
Anxiety Inventory scale. High socially anxious children gave significantly 
more negative attributions for explaining the outcome of negative events 
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than their non-socially anxious peers. More precisely, socially anxious 
children made more stable attributions for negative consequences of 
events whereas non-socially anxious children attributed significantly 
more global explanations for positive events. 
Recent advances in attribution theory suggest that socially anxious 
individuals, similar to depressed and lonely people, consistently explain 
their successes and failures in a self-defeating manner. Many authors 
have described them as possessing a 'maladaptive' attributional style. 
Recent research continues to support the significance of maladaptive 
attribution styles of social anxiety (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985; Leary, 1986). 
These studies provide encouragement for Zimbardo's (1977) suggestion 
that when shy or socially anxious individuals confront social difficulties 
they systematically blame themselves whereas non-shy or non-socially 
anxious persons blame the social situation. 
Several studies have examined the connections between social 
anxiety and attributional processes finding that socially anxious 
individuals as compared to non-socially anxious individuals are more 
likely to make self-protective, internal, and stable attributions for their 
social distress (Arkin, Appleman, & Berger, 1980; Girodo, Dotzenroth, & 
Stein, 1981; Johnson, Petzel, & Johnson, 1990). Results on the attribution 
dimensions for the current study were less supportive. Only the role of 
attributions to stable causes were supported by socially anxious children. 
An important aspect of attributional style is the way in which 
responsibility for the outcome of an event is allocated. Attributions to 
long-lasting, pervasive causes for negative outcomes rather than 
temporary, situational factors are common for socially anxious children. 
Socially anxious children maintain that negative outcomes of social 
encounters are expected to remain the same over time and do not expect 
these consequences to change. 
In terms of attribution theory, ascribing the outcome of a task to 
stable causes (ability and task difficulty) decreases the expectancy for success 
following failure or a negative outcome for socially anxious individuals. 
Low expectancy for success contributes to poor self-confidence (Feather, 
1969). In terms of self-confidence and risk-taking in social situations, 
attribution theory predicts that social outcomes that confirm one's 
expectations would accentuate levels of self-confidence whereas, social 
outcomes that disconfirm one's expectations would make one worry or 
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cynical about succeeding in social interactions (Girodo, Dotzenroth, & 
Stein, 1981). Generally socially anxious individuals do not take credit for 
their own performance and as a result, rnay not feel as competent as their 
non-socially anxious counterparts. 
Social psychologists have repeatedly demonstrated that people tend 
to take more responsibility for positive rather than negative events, a 
phenomenon known as the 'self-serving bias' (Miller & Ross, 1975). 
Consistent with attribution theory, non-socially anxious children in the 
present study made more global attributions for successful outcomes of 
events than their socially anxious peers. The generalizability of these self-
enhancing tendencies to all situations rnay be a form. of adjustment, or 
reflect part of the active coping style of children who do not become 
anxious in social situations. Feelings of competence are likely to be 
generalized to subsequent tasks. This contradicts Anderson and Arnoult's 
(1985) assertion that the stability and globality dimensions prove to be of 
little value when assessing social anxiety. 
Socially anxious individuals who are preoccupied with worry and 
self-doubt em.ploy social strategies such as a protective style of self-
presentation to create a desirable impression on others (Schlenker & Leary, 
1982). They choose to try and get along with others by conforming to 
majority opinion, change their views to coincide with those of an 
authority figure, and avoid disclosing any personal information 
pertaining to oneself (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Anxious participants in 
the present study similar to findings from. other studies examining 
attribution patterns (Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982; Girodo, Dotxenroth, & 
Stein, 1981) demonstrated that to some extent, socially anxious children 
reversed the self-serving bias and took more responsibility for negative 
social outcomes and less responsibility for positive social outcomes than 
non-anxious participants. Socially anxious individuals generally report 
significantly more modest attributions (attributing greater causality to 
them.selves for failure than for success) when they anticipate close scrutiny 
of their attributions and behaviour (Arkin, Appleman, & Burger, 1980). 
The self-punishing tendencies of socially anxious children is evident 
through their repeated criticisms about them.selves and their attributed 
responsibility for social failure. 
To the extent that individual attributions can be expected to change 
with the type of situation, the natural attributional style of the individual 
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may also be manipulated by changes in situations (Anderson & Arnoult, 
1985). Differences in attributional style may occur as a result of differences 
in situations such as success versus failure situations, or interpersonal 
versus non-interpersonal situations. The attributional style of socially 
anxious individuals has been reported to be situation-specific (Teglasi & 
Hoffman, 1982). This study illustrates the need to know more about the 
cognitive effects of success as well as failure experiences for participants 
differing in social anxiety and in attributional style. 
The similarity of attributional styles of the current study's socially 
anxious participants to those recognized in depressives raises some 
speculation. It may be possible that social anxiety or to some extent 
shyness in childhood, is an indication of risk for depression. Social 
anxiety in childhood may be a developmental process to the development 
of depression in early or late adulthood. To this extent however, we 
cannot presume that all socially anxious children or adults are predisposed 
to become depressed. 
In general the socially anxious persons self-concept consists of low 
self-esteem, low expectancies for success, anxious excessive self-focus, 
extreme self-consciousness, worry about receiving negative evaluations 
from others, preference for adopting a protective self-presentation style, 
self-blaming causal attributions, selective memory for negative self-
relevant information, which when combined form unrealistically harsh 
self-perceptions. In consideration of the numerous cognitive tendencies 
of socially anxious children, it is not surprising that they judge themselves 
more harshly than others judge them. The current results support the 
notion that negative and self-deprecatory cognitions are likely to 
accompany social anxiety reactions however, the causal relationship 
between the two remains unclear. Consistent with the present study, a 
variety of cognitive and cognitive-behavioural theorists suggest that 
maladaptive cognitions cause social anxiety to escalate (Beck, 1976; Ellis, 
1962; Mahoney, 1974; Meichembaum, 1977). On the other hand, it may be 
possible that cognitions and cognitive changes are the product of changes 
in anxiety experienced before or during social interactions rather than 
variables primarily concerned with the aetiology of social anxiety 
(Borkovec, 1978). 
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To some extent, social anxiety does offer some rewards and benefits. 
Snyder and Smith (1986) demonstrated from their own studies with shy 
individuals (Snyder, Smith, Augelli, & Ingram, 1985) that shyness may 
function as a self-handicapping strategy to protect one's self-esteem in 
evaluative situations or from external threats to one's image. 
Gough and Thorne (1986) demonstrated that social anxiety or more 
specifically shyness, is not necessarily a negative trait or characteristic. The 
negative stereotype is based primarily on self-reports of fears, anxieties, 
and doubts concerning personal worth and competency which 
automatically lead observers to label shy persons as weak, timid, and 
unambitious. To the extent that there is an observed negative side to 
shyness, there is an equally positive side to this characteristic. Among the 
unrecognized assets of the shy person lay the attributes of modesty, 
patience, equanimity, and self-control coupled with the fundamental 
symptoms of taciturnity and caution (Gough & Thorne, 1986). The merit 
of these positive characteristics of social anxiety warrants further research. 
Problems and Prospects 
The findings of the present study have highlighted several areas 
which need to receive further research attention. Clearly1 further research 
is needed to examine the specific relationship between social anxiety and 
childhood. Further, there is a need to examine the link between cognitive 
information-processing and social anxiety, as well as the role of self-
defeating cognitions and inhibitions. 
It seems unlikely at this stage that one all-encompassing theory of 
anxiety will be developed which is able to explain and predict all types of 
anxiety in all situations. It is therefore important for researchers to specify 
the type of anxiety they are investigating, and in which type of population 
this anxiety will typically be found. 
While the operation of the information-processing system may be 
related to clinical social anxiety, it might not be an important causal factor. 
For this reason, further attempts to pinpoint cognitive factors associated 
with the aetiology of clinically severe social anxiety will continue to be 
fraught with difficulties. 
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The issue of sample size needs to be taken into account in future 
research in this area. The sample size of the socially anxious and non-
socially anxious groups in the present study were small and replication 
with a larger sample size is advisable. In addition, the role of 
socioeconomic circumstances needs to be objectively measured. To 
provide support for Beck's theory, all aspects of the information-
processing approach should be objectively measured including the role of 
the schemata. Despite this, the results of this study represent one of the 
first attempts to examine the relationship between social anxiety and the 
cognitive information-processing operations in children. 
The present findings have implications for Beck's theory of adult 
anxiety. Many studies of adult social anxiety have not examined the 
specific cognitive distortions in information-processing measured in the 
present study. Nor have they followed up children into adulthood. Thus, 
one may only speculate that the children who tended to more strongly 
endorse the negative cognitions measured in the current study may be 
more vulnerable to suffering severe social anxiety later in adulthood. 
This however, does not necessarily mean that Beck's (1976) cognitive 
therapy is also applicable to socially anxious children but the results of the 
present study suggest this may be worthy of more direct investigation. 
The results also provide important implications for children in 
schools. The negative views of the socially anxious children regarding 
their cognitive abilities suggests the need for intervention aimed at 
cognitive restructuring and self-esteem building. In addition, a child's 
overall cognitive level and age should be considered when the level of 
social anxiety is assessed. Further research in this area is clearly needed 
that highlights the self-perceptions of socially anxious school-age children. 
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Conclusion 
Finally, the present study adds to the growing body of literature 
which suggests that cognitive factors are associated with subjective feelings 
of anxiety within social situations. The present study sought to specify the 
relations between social anxiety and the cognitive information-processing 
operations of children. To some extent it was successful. Socially anxious 
children displayed distortions in information-processing and showed an 
attentional bias towards threat-related information in social situations. In 
addition, socially anxious children reacted to negative or ambiguous 
situations with self-defeating cognitions and inhibitions. The results of 
the present study also suggested that children may experience social 
anxiety not because they are unable to behave in a socially competent 
manner per se, but it may be because they believe that they are socially 
incompetent. Thus, one must always look beyond the superficial and 
obvious reasons and entertain the possibility that motives exist which 
cannot be accurately recognised or predicted, given the complexity and 
uniqueness of each individual. 
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Appendix I 
Social Phobia and Anxiety Inventory (SP AI) 





Below is a list of behaviours that may or may not be relevant for 
you. Based on your personal experience, please indicate how frequently 
you experience these feelings and thoughts in social situations. A social 
situation is defined as a gathering of two or more people. For example: a 
meeting; a class; a party; a restaurant; talking with one other person or 
group of people, etc. FEELING ANXIOUS IS A MEASURE OF HOW 
TENSE, NERVOUS OR UNCOMFORTABLE YOU ARE DURING SOCIAL 
GATHERINGS. Please use the scale listed below and circle the number 
which best describes how often you experience these responses. 
There are no right or wrong answers, so always pick the response 
that seems the most likely to you. 
If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to 
your seat to answer it. Since this is a research study it is important that 






Infrequent Infrequent Sometimes Frequent 
5 
Frequent Always 
2 3 4 6 7 
1. I feel anxious when entering social situations where 
there is a small group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I feel anxious when entering social situations where 
there is a large group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I feel anxious when I am in a social situation and I 
become the centre of attention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. I feel anxious when I am in a social situation and I am 
expected to engage in some activity.................. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I feel anxious when making a speech in front of an 
audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. I feel anxious when speaking in a small informal 
meeting ............................................. . 
7. I feel so anxious about attending social gatherings that I 
avoid these situations ............................ . 
8. I feel so anxious in social situations that I leave the 
social gathering ................................... . 
9. I feel anxious when in a small gathering with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
10. I feel anxious when being in a large gathering with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
11. I feel anxious when in a restaurant or take-away with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





Infrequent Infrequent Sometimes Frequent Frequent Always 
2 3 4 5 
12. I feel anxious and do not know what to do when in a 
new situation 
with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
13. I feel anxious and I do not know what to do when in a 
situation 
involving confrontation with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. ................................. . 
14. I feel anxious and I do not know what to do when in an 
embarrassing situation with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
15. I feel anxious when discussing personal feelings with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
16. I feel anxious when saying my opinion to: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
17. I feel anxious when talking about school work with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





Infrequent Infrequent Sometimes Frequent Frequent Always 
2 3 4 5 
18. I feel anxious when approaching and/ or starting a 
conversation 
with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
19. I feel anxious when having to interact for longer than a 
few minutes with: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
20. I feel anxious when drinking and/ or eating in front of: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
21. I feel anxious when writing or typing in front of: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
22. I feel anxious when speaking in front of: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





Infrequent Infrequent Sometimes Frequent Frequent Always 
2 3 4 5 
23. I feel anxious when being criticized or rejected by: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. ................................. . 
24. I attempt to stay away from social situations where 
there are: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ........................................ . 
people in general. .................................. . 
25. I leave social situations where there are: 
strangers .......................................... . 
authority figures ................................... . 
opposite sex ....................................... . 
people in general. .................................. . 
26. Before entering a social situation I think about all the 
things that can go wrong. The types of thoughts I have 
are: 
6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Will I be dressed properly?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
What will I do if no-one speaks to me? ................ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
If there is a long silence in the conversation what can I 
talk about?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
People will notice how anxious I am. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
27. I feel anxious before entering a social situation. . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
28. My voice goes or changes when I am talking in a social 
situation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
29. I am not likely to speak to people until they speak to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 





Infrequent Infrequent Sometimes Frequent Frequent Always 
2 3 4 5 
30. I experience annoying thoughts when I am in a social 
setting. 
For example: 
I wish I could leave and avoid the whole situation .... . 
If I mess up again I will really feel silly ............... . 
I wonder what other people are thinking about me .... . 
Whatever I say will probably sound stupid ........... . 
31. I experience the following before entering a social 
situation: 
sweating .......................................... . 
frequent urge to go to the toilet ...................... . 
rapid heart beat. ................................... . 
32. I experience the following in a social situation: 
sweating .......................................... . 
blushing .......................................... . 
shaking ........................................... . 
rapid heart beat. .................................. . 
frequent urge to go to the toilet. .................... . 
6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
33. I feel anxious when I am home alone... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
34. I feel anxious when I am in a strange place. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
35. I feel anxious when I am on any form of public 
transportation. 
For example, bus, train, airplane. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
36. I feel anxious when crossing the street. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
37. I feel anxious when I am in crowded public places (e.g. 





Infrequent Infrequent Sometimes Frequent Frequent Always 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
38. Being in large open spaces makes me feel anxious. . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
39. I feel anxious when I am in enclosed places (elevators, 
tunnels, etc). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
40. Being in high places makes me feel anxious (e.g. tall 
buildings).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
41. I feel anxious when waiting in a long line. . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
42. There are times when I feel like I have to hold on to 
things because I am afraid I will fall. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
43. When I leave home and go to different public places, I 
go with a family member or friend. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
44. I feel anxious when riding in a car.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
45. There are certain places I do not go to because I may feel 





Here is a list of words that are in the questionnaire you have in front of 
you. The meaning of each word has been listed to help you understand 
some of the more difficult words. If you have a problem with some of the 
words, please raise your hand and I will come to your seat to help you. 
1 =Never= not at all, not ever, absolutely not. 
2 =Very Infrequent= not usually; very rarely almost never. 
3 =Infrequent = not that often, but occasionally. 
4 =Sometimes = now and then. 
5 =Frequent = often. 
6 = Very frequent = very often, nearly almost always. 
7 =Always = all the time. 
To feel anxious = how nervous or uncomfortable you are during social 
situations. 
Social Situation= a gathering of 2 or more people, e.g. a meeting, a class, a 
party, having a conversation with one person or a group of people. 
Small group/gathering= less than 10 people (see Question 1 & 9). 
Large group/gathering= more than 20 people (see Question 2 & 10). 
Engage in some activity = to take part in some task, work or activity (see 
Question 4). 
Avoid= to stay away from something or someone (see Question 7). 
Authority Figure = someone in charge, e.g. parents, teachers, headmasters, 
police. 
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Opposite sex = a girl if YOU are a boy or, 
a boy if YOU are a girl. 
People in General = people you see and meet everyday. 
Confrontation = meeting or talking or having a conversation with 
someone face to face (see Question 13). 
Interact = to talk with or play with someone (see Question 19). 
Criticized = when someone finds faults or mistakes with you or your work 
(see Question 23). 
Rejected = when someone does not believe you or accept you for who you 
are(see Question 23). 
Attempt= try (see Question 24). 
Enclosed places = when you are shut in or fenced in some place like a 
tunnel, a small room, a lift, (see Question 39). 
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Appendix III 
Children's Negative Cognitive Error 
Questionnaire 
(CNCEQ) 






This questionnaire describes a number of situations that might happen to kids. 
Each situation is followed by a thought that a kid in that situation might have. This 
thought is in "quotation marks". We want to know how similar that thought is to what you 
might think in that situation. 
Please read each situation and imagine that it is happening to you, even if it never 
has in the past. Then read the thought which is in "quotations". Circle the statement 
underneath each thought that best describes how similar that thought is to how you would 
think in that situation. 
As an example let's read this: 
A. You are the goalie for your soccer team. The game ends in a 1-1 tie. After the 
game you hear one of your teammates say that your team should have won 
today. You think, "He/She thinks it's my fault we didn't win." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
If the thought ("He/She thinks it's my fault we didn't win.") was somewhat like 
the way }'.:illLWould think in that situation, you would circle: 
somewhat like I 
would think 
B. You see two of your friends talking together at lunchtime. As you walk towards 
them, they go over to the softball field and start playing catch. You think, 
"Maybe they're mad at me about something." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
If the thought ("Maybe they're mad at me about something.") was a lot like the 
way you would think in that situation, you would circle: 
a lot like I 
would think 
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If you have a question, please raise your hand and I will come to your seat to answer 
it. Since this is a research study it is important that you answer honestly. Nobody else 
will be allowed to see your answers. Any questions? Please be certain to put your name at 
the top of this page and then tum to the first question. 
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1. You invite one of your friends to stay overnight at your house. Another one of your 
friends finds out about it. You think, "He/She will be real mad at me for not asking 
them and never want to be my friend again." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
2. Your class is having 4-person relay races in P.E. class. Your team loses. You think, "If I 
had just been faster we would not have lost." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
3. You are trying out for the school softball team. You get up four times and get two hits 
and make two outs. You think, "What a lousy practice I had." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
4. Your team loses a spelling contest. The other team won easily. You think, "If I were 
smarter, we wouldn't have lost." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
5. Some of your friends have asked you if you're going to try out for the school soccer team. 
You tried out last year but did not make it. You think, "What's the use of trying out, I 
couldn't make it last year." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
110 
6. You call one of the kids in your class to talk about your math homework. He/She says, 
"I can't talk to you now, my father needs to use the phone." You think, "They didn't 
want to talk to me." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
7. You and three other students completed a group science project. Your teacher did not 
think it was very good and gave your group a poor grade. You think, "If I hadn't done 
such a lousy job, we would have gotten a good grade." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
8. Whenever it is someone's birthday in your class, the teacher lets the student have a 
half hour of free time to play a game with another student. Last week it was one of 
your friend's birthday and they picked someone else. Now another of your friends is 
going to get to choose someone. You think, "They probably won't pick me either." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
9. Your softball team is having practice. The coach tells you he would like to talk to you 
after practice. You think, "He's not happy with how I'm doing and doesn't want me on 
the team anymore." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
1 1 1 
10. You went to a party with one of your friends. When you first got there your friend hung 
around with some other kids instead of you. Later you and your friend decide to stop at 
his/her house for a snack before you go home. Later that night you think, "My friend 
didn't seem to want to hang around with me tonight." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
11. You forgot to do your spelling homework. Your teacher tells the class to hand them in. 
You think, "The teacher is going to think I don't care and I won't pass." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
12. You were having a good day in school up until the last period when you had a math 
quiz. You did poorly on the quiz. "School is a drag, what a waste of time." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
13. You play basketball and score five baskets but missed two real easy shots. After the 
game you think, "I played poorly." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
14. Last week you had a history test and forgot some of the things you had read. Today you 
are having a math test and the teacher is passing out the test. You think, "I'll 
probably forget what I studied just like last week" 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
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15. You spent the day at your friend's house. The last hour before leaving you were really 
bored. You think, "Today was no fun." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
16. You are taking skiing lessons. The instructor tells the class that he does not think 
people are ready for the steep trails yet. You think, "If I could only learn to ski faster, 
I wouldn't be holding everyone up." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
17. Your class is starting a new unit in math. The last one was really hard. When it's time 
for math you think, "That last stuff was so hard I just know I'm going to have trouble 
with this too." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
18. You just started a part-time job helping one of your neighbours. Twice this week you 
were not able to go skating with your friends because of having to work. As you see 
your friends leaving to go skating, you think, "Pretty soon they won't ever want to do 
anything with me." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
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19. Last week one of the kids in your class had a party and you weren't invited. This past 
week you heard another student in your class telling someone he was thinking of 
getting some kids together to go to a movie. You think, "It'll be just like last week, I 
won't be asked to go." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
20. You did an extra assignment. Your teacher tells you that he would like to talk to you 
about it. You think, "He thinks I did a lousy job on my assignment and is going to give 
me a bad grade." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
21. You're with two of your friends. You ask if they would like to go to a movie this week-
end. They both say they can't. You think, "They probably just don't want to go with 
me." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
22. Your cousin calls you to ask if you'd like to go on a long bike ride. You think, "I probably 
won't be able to keep up and people will make fun of me." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
23. Your team has just lost in a spelling contest. You were the last one up for your team and 
had spelled four words right. The last word was "excellent" and you got it wrong. 
When you sit down you think, "I'm no good at spelling." 
This thought is: 
almost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 
not at all like I 
would think 
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24. Last week you played softball and struck out twice. Today some kids from your class ask 
you to play soccer. You think, "There's no sense playing, I'm no good at sports." 
This thought is: 
ahnost exactly 
like I would 
think 
a lot like I 
would think 
somewhat like I 
would think 
only a little 
like I would 
think 




Social Interaction Self-Statement Test 
(SISST) 






We are interested in the thoughts children have when they are in 
the company of other people. Listed on the next page is a variety of 
thoughts that pop into peoples' heads at some time before, during and 
after a situation that involves being with other people or talking to them. 
Please read each thought carefully and decide how often you may have 
been thinking a similar thought before, during and after you talked with 
them. 
Circle the number from 1 to 5 for each thought where: 
1 = hardly ever had the thought 
2 = rarely had the thought 
3 = sometimes had the thought 
4 = often had the thought 
5 = very often had the thought 
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2. I can usually talk to other people pretty well. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 
had the had the 
thought thought 
3. I hope I don't make a fool of myself. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 
had the had the 
thought thought 





















5. I'm really afraid of what other people think of me. 
1 2 3 
hardly ever rarely sometimes 
had the had the had the 
thought thought thought 
6. No worries, no fears. 
1 2 3 
hardly ever rarely sometimes 
had the had the had the 


















































7. I'm really scared. 
1 2 3 4 
hardly ever rarely sometimes often 
had the had the had the had the 
thought thought thought thought 
8. The others' probably won't be interested in me. 
1 2 3 4 
hardly ever rarely sometimes often 
had the had the had the had the 
thought thought thought thought 






































































































14. This will be a good opportunity. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 










15. If I blow this conversation, I'll really feel silly. 
1 2 3 
hardly ever rarely sometimes 
had the had the had the 
thought thought thought 
16. What I say will probably sound stupid. 
1 2 3 
hardly ever rarely sometimes 
had the had the had the 
thought thought thought 
17. What do I have to lose? It's worth a try. 
1 2 3 
hardly ever rarely sometimes 
had the had the had the 
thought thought thought 






























































19. Wow - I don't want to do this. 
1 2 3 4 
hardly ever rarely sometimes often 
had the had the had the had the 
thought thought thought thought 
20. It would hurt me if they didn't respond. 
1 2 3 4 
hardly ever rarely sometimes often 
had the had the had the had the 
thought thought thought thought 









22. I'm such a shy person. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 
had the had the 
thought thought 
23. I'll probably "bomb out" anyway. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 
had the had the 
thought thought 
24. I can handle anything. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 


























































































28. Maybe we'll hit it off real well. 
1 2 
hardly ever rarely 


























































































Children's Attributional Style Questionnaire 
(CASQ) 






Here are some situations. I want you to try really hard to imagine 
that these situations just happened to you. After each situation is 
presented, two possible reasons for why the situations might have 
happened are given. I want you to choose the most likely reason to 
explain why the situation happened to you. 
Sometimes both of the reasons may sound true, and sometimes 
both may sound false, and, you may never have been in some of these 
situations. But even so, I want you to pick the reason that seems to 
explain why the situation happened to you. 
There are no right answers and no wrong answers, so always pick 
the reason that seems the most likely to you. 
Circle either "A" or "B" for each question. Do you have any questions 
before we begin? 
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1. You get an "A" on a test. 
A. I am smart. 
B. I am good in the subject that the test was in. 
2. You go on a vacation with a group of people and you have fun. 
A. I was in a good mood. 
B. The people I was with were in good moods. 
3. Your pet gets run over by a car. 
A. I don't take good care of my pets. 
B. Drivers are not cautions enough. 
4. Some kids that you know say that they do not like you. 
A. Once in a while people are mean to me. 
B. Once in a while I am mean to other people. 
5. You get very good grades. 
A. School work is simple. 
B. I am a hard worker. 
6. A good friend tells you that he/she hates you. 
A. My friend was in a bad mood that day. 
B. I wasn't nice to my friend that day. 
7. You fail a test. 
A. Teachers make hard tests. 
B. Sometimes teachers make hard tests. 
8. A person steals money from you. 
A. That person is dishonest. 
B. People are dishonest. 
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9. Your parents praise something that you make. 
A. I am good at making some things. 
B. My parents like some things I make. 
10. You break a glass. 
A. I am not careful enough. 
B. Sometimes I am not careful enough. 
11. You do a project with a group of kids and it turns out badly. 
A. I don't work well with the people in the group. 
B. I never work well with a group. 
12. You make a new friend. 
A. I am a nice person. 
B. The people that I meet are nice. 
13. You have been getting along well with your family. 
A. I am easy to get along with when I am with my family. 
B. Once in awhile I am easy to get along with when I am with my 
family. 
14. You put a hard puzzle together. 
A. Sometimes I am good at putting puzzles together. 
B. Sometimes I am good at putting things together. 
15. You get a bad grade in school. 
A. I am stupid. 
B. Teachers are unfair graders. 
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16. You walk into a door and you get a bloody nose. 
A. I wasn't looking where I was going. 
B. I have been careless lately. 
17. You have a messy room. 
A. I did not clean my room that day. 
B. I usually do not clean my room. 
18. Your mother makes you your favourite dinner. 
A. There are a few things that my mother will do to please me. 
B. My mother likes to please me. 
19. A team that you are on loses a game. 
A. The team members don't play well together. 
B. That day the team members didn't play well together. 
20. You do not get your chores done at home. 
A. I was lazy that day. 
B. Many days I am lazy. 
21. You go to an amusement park and you have a good time. 
A. I usually enjoy myself at amusement parks. 
B. I usually enjoy myself. 
22. You go to a friend's party and you have fun. 
A. Your friend gives good parties. 
B. Your friend gave a good party that day. 
23. You have a substitute teacher and she likes you. 
A. I was well behaved during class that day. 
B. I am almost always well behaved during class. 
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24. You make your friends happy. 
A. I am a fun person to be with. 
B. Sometimes I am a fun person to be with. 
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Appendix VI 
Social Interaction Rating Scale 
(SIRS) 
(Hops, Fleishman, Guild, Paine, Street, Walker, & 
Greenwood, 1978) 
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Child's Name: Teacher: 
School: Grade: 
Date: 
1. Verbally responds to a child's initiation. 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Engages in long conversations (more than 30 seconds). 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Shares laughter with classmates. 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Spontaneously contributes during a group discussion. 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Volunteers for "show and tell." 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Freely takes a leadership role. 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Spontaneously works with a peer(s) on projects in class. 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. Verbally initiates to a peer(s). 
not moderately very 
descriptive descriptive descriptive 
or true or true or true 




(Zatz & Chassin, 1983) 
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Compared to the other kids in your class, how well do you expect to do on 
the exercises. 
On a scale from 1 to 4 rate your performance compared to the other kids in 
your class. 
1. I do well on tests like this. 




2. Tests like this are harder for me than the others. 
Definitely not Probably not Probably so 
1 2 3 
3. I'm bright enough to do this. 




4. My grade will be lower than the other kids. 
Definitely not Probably not Probably so 
1 2 3 
5. I will do better on this than the others. 




6. My grade will be higher than the other kids. 
Definitely not Probably not Probably so 
1 2 3 
7. This test is easy for me to do. 
Definitely not Probably not 
1 2 
8. I don't do well on tests like this. 























9. I am relaxed when I take tests like this. 
Definitely not Probably not 
1 2 
10. I'm doing poorly on this. 






11. I'm doing worse than the others on this. 
Definitely not Probably not Probably so 
1 2 3 
12. Tests like this make me nervous. 
Definitely not Probably not 
1 2 
Probably so 
3 
Definitely so 
4 
Definitely so 
4 
Definitely so 
4 
Definitely so 
4 
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